The best way to weaken anti-India forces in Pakistan is for New
Delhi to commit itself clearly and purposefully to a peace process with
the democratically elected civilian government there
The killing of five jawans at the Line of Control (LoC) has once again
hobbled our already halting progress towards peace with Pakistan and
shows that our soldiers have now become hostages to fortune: Pakistani
naysayers and their Indian mirror-images know that the easiest way to
stop a rapprochement is to kill an Indian soldier.
Under General Kayani, there has been a clear and very obvious shift in
the use to which skirmishes at the LoC are being put. Sending
infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir is of secondary importance; the
primary objective is to create incidents that would nip in the bud any
attempt to make peace. In 2008, every public statement by Asif Zardari,
proclaiming his intention to make peace was followed by an attack on a
soft Indian target. When raids on Indian soldiers at the LoC did not
work, our Embassy in Kabul was attacked, which did derail the process
for several months. When the leaders nevertheless met in New York in the
autumn and decided to resume the process, Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) went further with Mumbai, attacking it on the evening
that its Foreign Minister arrived in Delhi for talks.
Inverting past practice
Why are terrorists now attacking our troops at the LoC, when, earlier,
infiltrators tried to evade them? It is because their primary aim then
was to cause turmoil inside J&K, which could be passed off as local
opposition to Indian rule. By definition, if armed men were fighting
their way in, this fiction would be hard to maintain. Covering fire by
the Pakistan Army let the infiltrators get in undetected as our forces
kept their heads down.
The attacks now taking place are an inversion of earlier practice: the
infiltrators only target an Indian patrol, kill a few and then retreat
into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). This has nothing to do with
keeping the insurgency alive in J&K. These attacks have a purely
political objective, to create an outrage in India that will force the
government to take a hard line on the Pakistan government.
Why, though, must the Pakistan Army turn to subterfuge, instead of
making its government say that unless Kashmir is settled on its terms,
everything else has to wait? It is because there are few takers for this
line now in Pakistan. Most Pakistanis want a normal relationship with
India, and will support their government on this. The Army fears peace,
except on its terms, but does not want to be seen as the spoiler.
Instead of trying to mould Pakistani public opinion, therefore, it is,
with great success, moulding ours.
The challenge put by our media to our government, to decide if it wants
dialogue or security, is the one the Pakistan Army would like to pose to
its people, but now cannot. There is no choice involved. Every dialogue
between nations is to promote their interests, which include security.
Between nuclear-armed States, which cannot settle their differences
through war, as the United States and USSR showed, steady dialogue is
the proven way of whittling away at concerns over security. Dialogue
promotes security; security is not undermined by dialogue.
We have tried coercive belligerence, which stops short of war, in
Operation Parakram, but this did not pay dividends. After a year of
being Trishanku, we marched our men back from the border and resumed a
dialogue with Pakistan. That, of course, was with a general in power,
and it will be argued that a dialogue with a civilian government is
futile as long as its Army calls the shots. It is true that the Army is
still immensely powerful, but it no longer has an entirely freehand
vis-à-vis India, as the devious ploys it is using to block progress
show. This is because of the growing strength of Pakistani democracy.
Consensus for peace
Though we sneer at it, the last two elections there have been a clear
reflection of the will of the majority. Baiting India was not an issue
in either. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim
League (PML) are publicly committed to improving relations with us.
There is an implicit national consensus on this in Pakistan, which its
Army has shown that it cannot ignore, and which we must not.
It will still be argued that talking to Pakistan after terrorist attacks
would be rewarding it for bad behaviour, and therefore its government
must first give assurances that these will stop. This demand is
illogical, for three reasons. First, if we believe its Army does not
obey its politicians, we cannot expect them to give us these assurances.
Predicating dialogue on a condition which cannot be met is
self-defeating, because the Pakistan Army gets its strength from an
absence of peace with India. Stasis is what it wants. The more we show
that we will press ahead, and the more this determination is reflected
in practical, tangible benefits for the common man, the more the
Pakistan Army will be weakened, and the government strengthened. It is
only then that a civilian government there can crack the whip, not now.
Second, if we should not talk to, or do business with, a government
unwilling to rein in terrorists who operate from its territory, we
should remember that Iqbal Mirchi lived and died in the United Kingdom
and Dawood Ibrahim spends much of his time in the UAE. The governments
there were insensitive on a matter of the gravest national importance to
us, but we have deepened our ties with them nevertheless, simply
because that served our interests best. Why should we make an exception
in the case of the government of Pakistan?
Domestic parallel
Third, we are trying to make peace precisely because we do not have it.
The complete end of violence is the objective we expect to negotiate. It
is unreasonable to impose as a precondition for a dialogue something
that we hope will be its outcome. We have not done this in dealing with
politically-driven violence within India. The insurgencies in Mizoram,
Nagaland, Assam and Punjab would never have been contained had the
government of India not had the courage to start a political process
even while they continued. Sacrifices had to be made and lives lost, but
the violence was isolated and neutralised through a political process
which began with a dialogue.
Even now, in Assam, the Bodos whom the Army and police kill are
described in their reports as cadres of the “NDFB anti-talks faction.”
Our government should look on the Pakistan Army as the anti-talks
faction there, but hold a sustained dialogue with the civilian
government. Not talking to it, or putting the peace process in cold
storage, plays into the Pakistan Army’s hands; it does not persuade it
to change. We must make it clear to the generals that they cannot stymie
progress towards peace.
From Rajiv Gandhi’s time, every government has tried to make peace with
Pakistan, but has been thwarted by political problems there. Benazir
Bhutto in her first innings was undermined by the Army, using Nawaz
Sharif; when he saw the light, he was sabotaged by Musharraf, who,
however, as President, made a sustained effort with Prime Ministers
Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh to make peace. That failed at the last gasp
when he lost political support in Pakistan.
Now, however, between the PPP and the PML, there is a bipartisan
consensus in Pakistan that peace with India is in its interest. When the
time is propitious, it is tragic that politics has become so fractious
in India that on a matter of national interest, party political
differences dominate and inhibit our policy.
Moving ahead
It is important to stress, therefore, that talking to Pakistan does not
mean that we are soft on it. Trying to make peace with Pakistan is not a
sign of weakness. These are imperatives, which every government in
India has acknowledged over the last three decades. The government that
comes to power after the next election will do the same. It too will try
to make peace with Pakistan. If it does not, it will be abdicating its
responsibility and charting a course that diverges so completely from
its predecessors that it is unlikely to get broad, political support.
This government must therefore reach out to the country and explain why
it must continue to explore options of making peace with Pakistan. It is
a given that if the Prime Ministers agree to meet at the U.N. General
Assembly, there will be outrages at the LoC or in India, to torpedo the
meeting and ensure that, if it does take place, no substantive
discussions are possible. If the Prime Ministers do agree on the next
steps, the provocations will increase. These are inevitable. We can
certainly urge the government of Pakistan to stop these, but should know
that, realistically, they currently cannot. We must nevertheless
persevere so that they eventually can.