The recently notified Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code
2006 dilutes the pro-poor provisions of the UP Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950. It is a serious blow to attempts towards
equidistribution of land resources especially in the light of the fact
that the Ceiling Law has failed to make any dent in the land structure
of the state.
The author is thankful to K B Saxena, A K Singh and P C Tiwari for their valuable time to discuss these issues.
The Government of Uttar Pradesh (UP) notified the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code 2006 (hereafter referred to as the Code) which received
presidential assent in November 2012. It simultaneously achieves several
goals – it consolidates and amends the law relating to land tenures
(the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950) (ZA and LR Act)
and land revenue (the UP Land Revenue Act, 1901) while also ostensibly
simplifying the accompanying legal procedures. However, the most
critical aspect of this legislative activity that has escaped scrutiny
is that it reneges on a number of time-tested, pro-poor provisions of
the previous law.
The process of amending the law was set in motion by the previous
Samajwadi Party (SP) government and the bill was passed by the UP
assembly in September 2006. But at the time, it could not get
presidential assent and remained pending with the central government. In
2007, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) assumed power and the bill was
consigned to the back-burner. But while it halted the amendments, the
BSP missed the opportunity to resuscitate the pro-poor, pro-dalit
provisions of the old law. When the SP was voted back to power in 2012,
the amended bill was once again pursued and this time, it received
presidential assent. The new Act was notified in November 2012 and the
new rules were released early this year.
Definition of ‘Land’
Despite the potentially far-reaching consequences of the amended Act
for land tenure system in general, and landless peasants belonging
mostly to marginalised communities in particular, there is hardly any
discussion on these issues. This article analyses the specific
amendments that, it is argued here, constrain the poor peasantry’s
access to land without attempting to present a comprehensive review of
the Code.
The ZA and LR Act defines land as “land held or occupied for purpose
of agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes
pisciculture and poultry farming”. But the new Code defines land as
“land held or occupied for purpose connected with agriculture”. This
ambiguity in definition will exclude large tracts of land from the
purview of land reforms.
This is a serious blow to attempts towards equidistribution of land
resources, especially in the light of the fact that the Ceiling Law has
failed to make any dent in the land structure of the state. Till 2006,
only 3,69,362 acres (1,47,744 hectares) of land were declared surplus
and around 1,05,290 hectares were distributed among the landless. As per
the Agricultural Census (2005-06), the total operated area in UP stands
at around 180 million hectares. The statistics confirm that the ceiling
surplus programme has been a spectacular failure as merely 0.58% of
total operated area was distributed. To top it, the change in the
definition of “land” will douse any remaining hopes of distribution of
the ceiling surplus land.
Successive governments have claimed that there is no further scope
for ceiling surplus land distribution but even a cursory calculation
would prove that a lot can still be achieved towards implementing land
ceiling. For the purpose of comprehension, let us assume that uniform
ceiling has been implemented all over the state. The government itself
claims that more than 80% of the land is irrigated. Let us also assume
that the operational holding pattern reflects ownership structure as the
Agricultural Census (2005-06) data show almost negligible incidence of
tenancy in the state. A closer look at the landholding pattern in the
state reveals that there are 78,000 landholdings in the more than 7.5
hectare category covering an area of 8,50,000 hectares. The average size
of these holdings is around 11 hectares. Applying a ceiling of 7.5
hectares would amount to more than 2.63 lakh hectares of surplus land.
And if the ceiling limit is brought down to 4.0 hectares as suggested by
the agrarian reforms committee,
1 it would amount to as many
as 4,55,752 holdings covering an area of 27,97,866 hectares. In other
words, the area qualifying as ceiling surplus land would be more than
9.7 lakh hectares. This is as much as nine times higher than the total
ceiling surplus land distributed so far!
Homestead Land
Sections 123(1) and 123(2) of ZA and LR Act had provided for
regularisation of possession by house-site-less scheduled
caste/scheduled tribe (SC/ST) and village artisan households on
government and private land, respectively, held for housing purpose.
Besides, provisions were also there to give house-site pattas on
gram samaj land. Sections 63 and 64 of UP Revenue Code, 2006 provide for allotment of
abadi
sites. But the new Code has done away with regularisation of
possession, the most popular provision of the old Act. This is
substantiated by the fact that while the BSP had no considered policy
with regard to land reforms in spite of the landless forming a majority
of the party’s core vote, successive BSP governments kept updating
cut-off date for regularisation of possession. It became almost a
tradition that each time Mayawati was to be sworn in as chief minister
of the state, the oath-taking ceremony coincided with a fresh cut-off
date for regularisation of possession. The latest cut-off date for
regularisation of possession was 13 May 2007, the day the last BSP
government took over reins of the state. However, the BSP did absolutely
nothing to amend the draft bill in favour of the landless despite a
full majority in the UP assembly during 2007 to 2012.
Even for cases of abadi site allotment under Sections 63 and 64 of
the Code, the priority list is amended. The Code keeps agriculture
labour and artisan on par in the priority list. People belonging to SCs,
STs, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and below poverty line (BPL)
categories are given the same priority. This means that the sections at
the bottom of the rung – agricultural labour and dalits – do not get the
priority they desperately deserve.
The UP Revenue Code 2006 Section 98 restricts a SC landowner from
selling his land located outside the area of urban development
authorities to a non-SC person without the district collector’s
approval. Additionally, the seller must have more than 1.265 hectares of
land. Section 99 of the Code completely prohibits tribal land being
sold to a non-tribal.
But Sections 80 and 81 provide for lifting of the above-mentioned
restrictions if “land use” is changed by filing a declaration. A similar
provision was in existence in the shape of Section 143 of ZA and LR but
the new Code appears to be even more liberal in lifting restrictions
imposed on transfer of such land. This is likely to dispossess a large
number of SCs and STs of their land. Several other sections were of
immense importance in providing protection to the weaker sections. The
new Code has not included any of these provisions.
Regularisation of Possession
Similarly, the marginalised sections are further weakened by relaxing
of provisions that provided for regularisation of possession. Section
122B(4F) of ZA and LR had provided for regularisation of possession of
SCs, STs and landless agricultural workers on gram samaj agricultural
land. The new Code does not have any provision to this effect.
Reversal of Land Reforms
The new legislation has far-reaching consequences in terms of
reversing the impact of whatever little land reforms took place in UP.
It disempowers the landless further in a state where landownership
structures have remained skewed. For instance, the share of dalits in
terms of the number of operational holdings stands at 17.12% and their
share in total operated area is merely 10.85%. This is a
disproportionately minuscule number as dalits constitute as much as 21%
of the population and a comparatively larger section among them depends
on agriculture.
Data from the agricultural census also reveals stark inequality
between dalits and non-dalits in UP. While the average size of
landholding for all social groups is 0.83 hectare, for dalits it is only
0.53 hectare. For non-dalits, it stands at 0.89 hectare. Absolute
landlessness among dalits in UP may not appear so high but functional
landlessness is still very high. Two-thirds of landholdings belonging to
dalits are less than 0.5 hectare. The average size of landholding in
this category is only 0.23 hectare. As many as 87% of the total dalit
holdings fall in the category of less than one hectare.
Unlike previous land legislations aimed at providing ownership to the
landless, this Code appears to have focused on making the land tenure
system of the state more market compatible in terms of liberalising land
usage conversion, easing restrictions on sale of land belonging to the
SCs and STs and with changed definition of “land” almost watering down
any possibility of implementation of the Ceiling Act. What is happening
is a reversal of land reforms aimed at “land to the tiller” (Saxena
2010). After the repeal of the Urban Ceiling Act, builders, colonisers
and investors in land property have been acquiring agricultural land on a
vast scale. This phenomenon is being scaled up by including more and
more villages in municipal areas. The ZA and LR Act gave right of
utilisation of agricultural land to the tenure holder in the manner s/he
wants. This provision was also misinterpreted by authorities and
builders alike and a number of residential colonies have been coming up
on the land which was still recorded as agricultural.
All these changes seem to reflect a new discourse on land reforms
which can be categorised as market-led land reforms. This view calls for
phasing out or replacing “traditional” measures of land distribution.
As part of
non-traditional measures, one is advised not to view
ceiling laws as a fundamental component of future land reform efforts
(Hanstad et al 2008); and provision for loans to the poor for buying
land from market is proposed. This discourse focuses and promotes
liberalisation of land sale market by doing away with all the
restrictions put on changes in land use – from agriculture to
non-agriculture and by allowing industrialists or other non-agricultural
land users to directly negotiate with landowners for purchase of their
land (World Bank 2007). Experts also call for legitimising leasing of
land (Haque 2003) where it remains illegal till now and eliminating
restrictions on land rental and lease term where leasing is legal but
these restrictions are in place.
While pursuing these measures, the state totally ignores the reality
that from the dalit standpoint, land reforms are not just transfer of an
economic asset in their favour but also entail a reversal of a
discriminatory sociopolitical structure. Land reforms through market
totally sidetrack this cardinal element. Land reform is not just
empowerment of the landless and the poor through assured access to the
redistributive land and tenurial security but disempowerment of the
powerful top landowning households as well (Bandyopadhyay 2002).
One of the major provisions of the ZA and LR Act that is retained in
the new Code is ban on tenancy with few exceptions. This has happened
despite strong advocacy of legalisation by experts and international
organisations. The argument of legalisation of tenancy mainly rests on
the premise that by taking cognisance of de facto practice, the state
would be in a position to intervene to protect interests of the poor.
Second, tenancy facilitates access of land poor to otherwise
inaccessible land. While doing so, a very simple reality is ignored –
that persistence of tenancy is only a reflection of unequal land
distribution and most of the land legislations were intended to correct
this imbalance. So instead of treating a deep “malaise”, the state would
end up institutionalising it if tenancy is legalised. As far as
intervention of the state is concerned, voices in the media and
political circles are already getting louder to eliminate restrictions
on terms of tenancy where it is legal. Moreover, with a large body of
evidence revealing increasing practices of reverse tenancy, it is hard
to claim that legalisation would facilitate flow of land from the rich
to the poor.
Central Government’s Advisory
Following the Agra Agreement with
Janadesh, in March 2013, the
Ministry of Rural Development issued a detailed advisory to the state
government on land reforms. The state government is advised to update
irrigation status of land and apply ceiling for irrigated land which has
acquired irrigation facilities after the cut-off date while refixing
ceiling for irrigated land at five acres. The advisory also exhorts the
state government to withdraw various types of blanket exemptions given
in Ceiling Act to
goshala (cow shelters), charitable and
religious trusts, plantations and stud farms, certain areas, every adult
son, educational institutions. It also calls for amendment to the
Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recovery Act) of 1989
and set up a special Task Force of revenue officials and gram sabha for
identification of Benami Transactions and further take appropriate
actions to distribute these lands to the eligible landless poor, with
priority given to the marginalised women. The advisory emphasises
amending respective clauses of the new Code to regularise possession of
homestead land, provide protection against alienation and insert
“personal cultivation” in the Code including family labour, residential
status and dependence on agriculture for livelihood as preconditions.
The advisory is an exemplary document in paving the way for
distribution of land to the landless. If the state government’s
much-touted land reform agenda is to be implemented in its true sense,
the market logic of land reforms will have to be shunned in favour of
vigorous implementation of the measures described by the central
government in its advisory and bringing back all pro-poor provisions of
the previous law.
Note
1 Committee on State Agrarian Relations and Unfinished Task in Land
Reforms, GoI suggested a new set of limits of 5-10 acres (2-4 hectares)
in the case of irrigated land and 10-15 acres (4-6 hectares) for
non-irrigated land.
References
Bandyopadhay, D (2002): “The Forgotten Agenda”,
Economic & Political Weekly, 37 (52): 5179-81.
Hanstad, Tim, T Haque and Robin Nielsen (2008): “Improving Land Access for India’s Rural Poor”,
Economic & Political Weekly, 43(10): 49-56.
Haque, T (2003): “Reforms for Agricultural Growth and Rural Development”,
Economic & Political Weekly, 38(48): 5031-33.
Saxena, K B (2010): “Land Reforms – Unfinished Agenda or Reversal of Policy”, Manoranjan Mohanty (ed.),
India Social Development Report – The Land Question and the Marginalised, Oxford University Press and Council for Social Development.
World Bank (2007): “India – Land Policies for Growth and Poverty
Reduction”, Agriculture and Rural Development, Sector Unit, India
Country Management Unit, South Asia Region.
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