[IDSA]
A study of insurgencies reveals that security forces tend to lose the
support of intelligentsia and media, as the movement tends to prolong.
It is often a result of either low levels of violence or casualties,
beginning of an electoral process and the re-establishment of local
administration machinery. More importantly, it is the result of missing
the wood for the trees. This is especially true for Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K).
A recent opinion piece by the Editor of a major national daily,
argued that it is time for the withdrawal of the army from Kashmir. In
his article, he alludes to the army vetoing government proposals on
Siachen troops withdrawal and dilution of Armed Forces Special Powers
Act (AFSPA). He contends that past conditions represented “a proxy war
launched from Pakistan and they have been defeated”. He further adds
that if “Hizb or Lashkar thugs again surface some place, you can easily
confront them with overwhelming force within minutes.” Finally, in order
to illustrate peace on ground, he quotes a figure of 17 security force
casualties in 2012.
The spirit of the article rightly highlights the need to build upon
the peace dividend, offered by the relative conditions of peace in the
state. The need for bold and imaginative political initiatives, as must
always be the case for final settlement of popular discontentment, is
also seconded without reservation. However, the reading of the situation
and solutions offered indicates a rather simplistic understanding of
conditions in India’s neighbourhood and within the state.
The assertion that the army can veto a government proposal on issues
like Siachen or AFSPA, is either a case of misunderstanding of
constitutional powers and privileges, or an under estimation of
parliamentary democracy. The last sixty years have proved on more
occasion than one that the armed forces remain firmly under the control
of civilian leadership in India. It has also been seen that decision
making remains a function of elected representatives, albeit with advice
from various state organs. Therefore, while the advice of the army on
both issues is in public domain to deduce that this advice functions as a
veto, is a gross overestimation of the powers and influence of the men
in uniform. The government receives inputs from various sources, as a
prelude to decision making. Critical inputs are provided by intelligence
agencies, as well as state and central administrative representatives.
Army happens to be one amongst these agencies.
The article also declares defeat of Pakistan’s proxy war in J&K.
This would be the likely conclusion, if the basis of assessments are the
violence figures between 2008 and 2012 (Table 1).
Table 1 - Trends of Terrorist Violence in J&K
|
Year |
Incidents |
SFs Killed |
Civilians Killed |
Terrorists Killed |
| 2005 |
1990 |
189 |
557 |
917 |
| 2006 |
1667 |
151 |
389 |
591 |
| 2007 |
1092 |
110 |
158 |
472 |
| 2008 |
708 |
75 |
91 |
339 |
| 2009 |
499 |
79 |
71 |
239 |
| 2010 |
488 |
69 |
47 |
232 |
| 2011 |
340 |
33 |
31 |
100 |
| 2012 |
220 |
15 |
15 |
72 |
Source: Annual Report 2012-13, Ministry of Home Affairs
However, a careful analysis of existing circumstances belies these
claims and can often throw up misleading results. A brief look at the
increased violence figures along the LoC, not only highlights this
paradox, but also provides a sign of times to come in 2014. 2013
witnessed the highest ceasefire violations in eight years. This was also
accompanied by a sharp increase in security force casualties until
August 18, 2013. By this time, 36 soldiers had already been killed, as
compared to 15 during the complete 2012. This was also accompanied by
higher numbers of successful infiltration, which is borne by an increase
in security force casualties within the state. This is by no stretch of
imagination a situation, which can be classified as return of normalcy
in the state. The security situation in the state is not only linked
with the conditions along the LoC but also geo-political realities in
India’s neighbourhood.
A closer look at the events in the Af-Pak region suggest that the
de-induction of US led forces from Afghanistan in 2014, is likely to
become a tipping point for Pakistan to re-establish its control by
proxy in that country. This could witness, a deflection of
jehadi
forces from Afghanistan towards their next battle ground in Kashmir.
Irrespective of this possible deflection of jehadi forces, the end of
war in Afghanistan is definitely likely to result in release of
Pakistani forces deployed in the region and their re-deployment along
traditional areas of the border with India. Both these factors will
strengthen Pakistan’s ability to heighten tensions along the Line of
Control (LoC), as also induct terrorists through vulnerable areas. This
should in turn call for careful analysis and monitoring of the
developing situation in India’s neighbourhood.
The call for de-induction of the army from the state is also
misleading. The deployment in J&K follows a three tier pattern. The
urban areas are provided security by the local police and central police
forces. The rural hinterland has the deployment of Rashtriya Rifles
(RR), which is a para military force. The army is deployed on the LoC,
with the task of maintaining the territorial integrity of the country
and stopping infiltration of terrorists. Therefore, any call for
de-induction of the “army” is misleading. If it is presumed that the
call actually pertains to the RR, then it needs careful analysis if its
areas of deployment are peaceful enough for denudation of forces. It
also needs to be questioned if the already stretched CRPF, which also
looks after Naxal hit areas has the numbers and capacity to undertake
this additional responsibility. The army has maintained for long that
deployment in counterinsurgency areas adversely impacts its ability to
concentrate on its primary role of guarding the nation’s borders. It is
in the interest of the country and the army that the CRPF takes over
these responsibilities. However, the question that begs an answer is,
whether the CRPF is ready for this task?
The final assertion of the article deals with the ability to redeploy
in case of an adverse situation in a matter of “minutes”. It needs to
be understood that the mere deployment of a force is not a guarantee for
its immediate effectiveness. Unlike flag marches in aid to civil
authorities, deployment in terrorist infected areas requires the buildup
of operational and intelligence network by units, which takes months if
not years of diligent effort. Secondly, the initial deployment of
security forces in an area is often referred to as the “kinetic” phase
of operations, which is usually accompanied by heavier casualties and
collateral damage, given the large presence of terrorists. Therefore,
re-deployment is likely to be accompanied by not only greater security
force casualties, but more importantly civilian ones as well. Therefore,
any decision to de-induct forces must be deliberate, reasoned and well
considered.
Over a period of time, some sections within the media and
intelligentsia have misunderstood the army’s presence in disturbed areas
as a reflection of its vested interests. It is time that the reality of
its role and responsibility are better understood and articulated. The
induction of the army in an internal security scenario is accompanied by
the task of bringing violence down to levels, wherein, the elected
representatives of the state and the administrative machinery can
function effectively. At this stage, political negotiations attempt to
find a respectable and long term solution to the problem at hand.
Therefore, the timing of these negotiations and the call to undertake
bold measures must be a decision guided by the elected representatives
of the country. The army was and shall remain one of the cogs in the
wheel that assists in the running of state machinery.
The reduction of the army’s numbers, visibility and presence must
come. However, the prevailing realities in India’s neighbourhood, its
impact on J&K, as well as the recent spurt in violence suggest that
the time is not opportune for this decision. It would be appropriate to
better understand the impact of US led de-induction from Afghanistan in
2014, along with the conditions both on the LoC and inside the state,
before a decision on the issue is taken.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.