I consider it a privilege to be here this evening, to deliver the YB
Chavan memorial talk, honouring an illustrious Defence Minister during
whose tenure the IDSA was founded.
Shri YB Chavan, freedom-fighter, social-activist and veteran
politician was the Chief Minister of Maharashtra when his services were
sought by PM Nehru, at a crucial juncture in our history; to shoulder
the defence portfolio in 1962. His firm and resolute handling of
national security issues after the trauma of the Sino-Indian war evoked
admiration all round. After holding a succession of key portfolios, Sh.
Chavan eventually rose to be deputy PM in 1979, but he is best
remembered for his contribution as one of India’s ablest Defence
Ministers.
Introduction
With Navy Day just around the corner, this seems to be a most
appropriate time to be discussing nautical issues, and there could not
be a topic more pertinent than maritime security.
This is a term which connotes different things to different navies.
While some perceive maritime security in a narrow sense as measures for
force-protection and defense against sabotage, others include actions to
combat terrorism and illegal activities like piracy and trafficking;
still others expand it to embrace the protection of territorial waters
and sea lanes. Adopting an inclusive approach, we in India define
maritime security as; comprising a collection of all the issues that
pertain to the seas, and have a bearing on national security. These
include, inter-alia, seaborne trade and infrastructure for its pursuit,
management of sea resources, environmental issues and employment of
naval forces.
However, for those of you whose mental picture of ‘maritime security’
evokes images of warships and submarines, a lot has happened in the
recent past to draw comfort from. The nuclear reactor of India’s first
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) went critical on 9th August 2013 in
Vishakhapatnam, to be followed, three days later, by the launch of the
indigenous aircraft-carrier in Kochi. Earlier, in 2012, a Russian
nuclear-powered attack submarine had been inducted on a 10-year lease.
Over the next decade, the Indian Navy (IN) navy expects delivery of;
seven stealth frigates, six diesel submarines, and 30 other warships,
apart from over 150 fighters, maritime-patrol aircraft and helicopters.
And even as I speak, our brand-new aircraft-carrier INS
Vikramaditya is preparing to sail from Russia on her homeward-bound voyage,
All these acquisitions will cost the exchequer in the region of about
25-30 billion US$, and we must note two important aspects in this
context. Firstly, there are not many navies, world-wide, which have
seen, in recent years, or are likely to see; in the midst of a global
economic downturn, such significant accretions to their order-of-battle.
Secondly, this force build-up, once complete, will not only enhance the
Navy’s combat capability by an order of magnitude, but would also alter
the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, provided necessary
strategic guidance is forthcoming from government.
The question that begs an answer, then, is: if such a happy prospect
prevails at sea, why do we need to discuss maritime security in today’s
forum?
Ambit of Maritime Security
One reason, as I just mentioned, is the ambivalence about what
constitutes maritime security. The other is that maritime security has
many dimensions, of which some, like force-structures, capabilities,
threats and strategies, find frequent mention. For this evening’s
discussion I intend to give priority to some lesser known and neglected
aspects of our maritime-matrix, which require attention, and then I will
address threats and challenges at sea.
- Firstly; maritime security lies in the mind, and needs to be dealt
with on a cognitive plane. For centuries we have remained ignorant about
our ancient maritime tradition and its subsequent decline. When
queried, we do not assert India’s right to revive this hoary maritime
tradition.
- Secondly; while rejoicing over the Indian Navy’s growth we need to remind ourselves of its basic purpose or raison d’etre and the fact that sustenance of a powerful and expensive navy requires the support of a sound industrial base.
- Thirdly; it is necessary for our decision-makers to appreciate that
maritime security must be viewed in a holistic manner. Therefore, many
shortcomings in the civilian maritime domain which have an adverse
impact on maritime security need to be set right.
- Lastly; we need to peer at the crystal ball and see how well prepared we are for future maritime security challenges.
Let us, first, take a look at history, in order to recall the roots
and provenance of India’s maritime growth and to trace the decline of
its maritime power. Otherwise, we are in danger of invoking George
Santayana’s curse that those ‘who forget history are condemned to
re-live the past’.
The Roots of India’s Maritime Growth
Although India’s ancient maritime tradition pre-dates Greek, Roman
and Carthaginian exploits in the Mediterranean, not enough is known
about it, because we had neither a Herodotus nor Thucydides to record
history; and our past suffers from a lack of documentation. For this
reason, we have had to accept accounts, authored by Western historians,
which rarely make mention of the seafaring skills of the ancient Arabs,
the Chinese, or Indians. And yet, tangible evidence of India’s
widespread cultural, religious and linguistic imprint – dating back 2-3
millennia - is available. It is found, not just around the Indian Ocean
rim, but extending, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.
A lone Indian voice in this historiographic void is that of Sardar KM
Panikkar; statesman, diplomat and visionary. According to Panikkar, due
to its earlier civilization and its predictable system of monsoon
winds, it was the Indian Ocean region, and not the Mediterranean or
Aegean Seas, which saw the world’s first oceanic sailing activity.
Arguing that ancient Hindus possessed the skills to construct sturdy
ocean-going ships and knew the use of a magnetic compass for accurate
navigation, he clinches his extensive arguments by stating that:
“Millenniums
before Columbus sailed the Atlantic and Magellan crossed the Pacific,
the Indian Ocean had become a thoroughfare of commercial and cultural
traffic.”
Panikkar paints a fascinating picture of India’s maritime past as he
describes the activities that took place in the 4th century BCE Mauryan
Empire. He provides evidence that the waters of the Bay of Bengal
witnessed a continuum of commercial colonization as well as cultural and
religious osmosis by sea from India’s east coast ports to south-east
Asia. The existence of ancient Hindu kingdoms right across SE Asia, then
known as
Suvarnabhumi, is still vividly evident in the architecture, culture and religious beliefs of this region.
Panikkar also reminds us that this cultural empire could not have
been sustained without the endeavours of skillful and courageous Indian
seafarers who braved the turbulent Bay of Bengal for generations.
Significantly, Panikkar debunks the thesis that overseas travel for
Hindus had been banned by a Brahmanical fiat; saying that the ‘ban’
perhaps applied only to people in north India.
How did, then, the maritime decline of India come about?
The Decline of India’s Maritime Power
From the 5th century AD command of the eastern waters and Malacca
Straits passed into the hands of a great Indian maritime power, known as
the Sri Vijaya Empire, based in Sumatra. The Sri Vijaya kings retained
mastery over the surrounding waters through a powerful navy, and
controlled all shipping traffic. In the year 1007 AD, the Indian Emperor
Rajendra of the south Indian Chola dynasty fitted out a powerful fleet
and challenged the Sri Vijayas. The ensuing 100-year war weakened both
empires and heralded the serious decline of Hindu sea power.
During the 12th and 13th centuries, as Central Asian hordes poured
down our mountain passes to conquer the rich Gangetic plain, India’s
maritime power gradually withered, and oceanic trade passed into the
hands of the Arabs. In May 1498, when the Portuguese adventurer Vasco da
Gama arrived off Calicut, the Sultanate of Delhi was ruled by the
Afghan Lodhi Dynasty, while Southern India was divided between the
Bahamini and Vijayanagaram kingdoms. None of them were blessed with a
maritime vision, much less a navy; and India’s maritime prowess went
into rapid decline.
Panikkar, however, reminds us that there were brave and resolute sea
captains who led indigenous naval forces, and put up determined
resistance against seaborne interlopers. While nautical heroes like
Kunjali Marakkar and Kanhoji Angre constitute bright spots in an
otherwise bleak maritime scenario, they commanded coastal forces which
could never match the oceanic supremacy of the Europeans.
Fifteenth century Europe had seen many advances in the areas of
shipbuilding and ocean navigation as well as metallurgy and cannon
founding. We must note that it was this technological edge, which
enabled European merchant-adventurers, to undertake long-distance
voyages into uncharted oceans, and to overwhelm natives of eastern
lands. The toe-holds they gained, in the form of trading posts,
eventually metamorphosed into full blown empires.
Panikkar consistently emphasizes that India’s fate has been
determined not on land frontiers, but on the oceanic expanse that washes
its three sides. He declares that India will be in peril if the Indian
Ocean ever ceases to be a ‘protected sea.’ Lamenting our inherited
sea-blindness, Panikkar sounded a clear warning in 1945:
“While to
other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the oceanic areas, to
India it is the vital sea. Her future is dependent on the freedom of its
waters.”
Having established India’s historical maritime credentials and the
criticality of our maritime security to national survival, let me change
tack from Panikkar to Mahan and seek the latter’s wisdom regarding the
purpose of sea power.
The Purpose of Sea Power
American strategist Admiral Mahan, writing in 1902, says:
“War
has ceased to be the natural, or even normal, condition of nations, and
military considerations are subordinate to the other great interests
they serve; economics and commerce.” He insists that since the true
path to national prosperity and greatness lies in peacetime trade,
ensuring access to sources of economic well-being, i.e. foreign trade,
commerce and natural resources are of paramount importance; sea power
being only a means to this end. A hundred years after he made this
pronouncement, we, in India, need to pay heed to Mahan’s words.
In our own context, the dramatic growth of India’s economy has been
stimulated by the powerful phenomenon of globalization; leading to not
just large foreign direct investment in India, but also heavy Indian
investment abroad. Thus, along with an Indian diaspora of over 20
million, we also have growing economic interests world-wide. India’s
economy as well as progress and prosperity depend on international
trade, which is carried overwhelmingly by sea; as is energy, the
lifeblood of our industry. These factors, coupled with the prospects of
harvesting oceanic resources and India’s growing international profile,
have helped awaken an overdue realization of our dependence on the seas.
A fortuitous sequence of events has also alleviated the inherited
continental-mindset of India’s decision-makers, which engendered the
so-called ‘sea-blindness’ syndrome. Over the past decade and a half, the
trauma of rampant piracy, the 26/11 exposure of India’s soft
coastal-underbelly, its ‘Look East’ initiative, and the looming menace
of China’s Navy have stimulated a sharper focus on maritime security.
The fact is that India is a maritime nation, not just by historical
tradition but also because its geophysical configuration and
geo-political circumstances makes it as dependent on the seas as any
island nation. Let us remember that with 11 maritime states and island
territories India probably has more seafaring people than the population
of most European countries. When we say that a ‘maritime awakening’,
has recently occurred in India, we must remember that it is largely
confined to the national-security elite. It has not affected most
decision-makers in other sectors of the government, as well as much of
the populace.
We need to be quite clear that contrary to popular perception, a
country’s maritime strength does not reside, exclusively, in its navy;
which is merely one of a number of components that complement each other
in contributing to maritime security. In fact, by creating an expensive
navy and neglecting the other constituents of maritime power we are
indulging in self-delusion. There is an urgent need to focus on the
other aspects, many of them belonging to the civil sector, that are
needed to make India a complete maritime nation.
Before I explore the linkages of the civilian maritime sector with
maritime security, let me touch upon the kind of support that our navy
seeks, but rarely receives from national industry.
The Missing Industrial Underpinning
It is a quirk of fate that India has become a significant military
and economic entity, with great-power aspirations, before it has
become a significant industrial power or even a major trading nation.
Thus India finds itself in an anomalous situation wherein it possess
nuclear weapons and boasts of the world’s 5th or 6th largest armed
forces, but is forced to support their operational requirements through
massive imports. There is inadequate realization of two facts; one, that
every piece of hardware that the Indian armed forces acquire from
abroad places them at the mercy of the seller nation for the lifetime of
the equipment; and two, that if our peacetime arsenals remain
half-empty –whatever the reason - how will we ever fight a war?
The nonchalance with which we continue to import huge quantities of
defence hardware not only undermines our security but renders all talk
of ‘strategic autonomy’ quite meaningless. India is fortunate in having
a vast defence technology and industrial base (DTIB) which could be the
envy of developed nations. This base comprises thousands of talented
scientists working in a network of sophisticated DRDO laboratories
backed by the advanced production facilities of the ordinance factories
and defence production units. And yet, India’s DTIB has rendered our
armed forces hollow, by failing to deliver, for six decades,
capabilities they direly need. A willing and capable private sector has
been kept out of defence production while many PSUs have hoodwinked the
nation with spurious claims of ‘transfer of technology’ and
‘indigenisation’.
In a related context, it is preposterous and irrational that while
the MoD has no qualms about importing billions worth of weapons from
abroad, it should strongly resist any suggestion about private Indian
companies entering the defence sector. This single measure has deprived
the navy of the support that a capable private sector industrial base
that could have provided, in peace and in war. Consequently, the navy’s
operational readiness remains hostage, on one hand to the inefficient
and complacent public sector, and on the other, to unreliable foreign
suppliers.
If all these shortcomings are worrisome, of equal concern is the
continuing inability or unwillingness of the political leadership to
address them in a meaningful way. But let us now turn to the civilian
aspects of the maritime domain.
The Civil Maritime Domain
Considering that 97% of our trade is carried by sea, the civil
maritime sector, defined by the Ministry of Surface Transport as
encompassing port operations, the merchant fleet, the shipbuilding
industry and trained human resources, is a vital component of maritime
security. Interestingly Admiral Mahan, while stipulating the conditions
vital to the maritime power of a nation, also included ‘character of the
government and its institutions’. In our case, this lacuna is sadly
apparent in the neglect shown by the Government of India towards the
maritime sector since independence.
Today there is no single government agency, which has either the span
of responsibility or the authority to act as the focal point for
India’s maritime policies and interests. As many as sixteen different
ministries, departments or organizations (including the Indian Navy and
the Coast Guard) are involved in ocean related matters and most of the
time there is complete lack of coordination between the different organs
of the government. Moreover, generalist bureaucrats have been placed in
positions which require specialist maritime knowledge and expertise.
This has resulted in a lack of direction and even confusion in certain
areas like coastal and port security, traffic management, pollution
control, fisheries regulation and anti-piracy measures.
Organizations like the Directorate General of Shipping and respective
Port Trusts which are mandated to exercise regulation and control in
all such matters, have neither the means nor the inclination to act. On
the other hand, timely help and advice is never sought, from
professional maritime organizations, like the Coast Guard and Navy,
which possess adequate means and ability.
Today happens to be the 5th anniversary of the 26/11 terror attack on
Mumbai, but even the trauma and humiliation of this tragic event was
insufficient to shake the government out of its apathy to undertake
formulation of a maritime security policy or constitute an advisory body
for maritime security. All that happened was some re-allocation of
duties between the navy and the coast guard, which has further
confounded an already confused coastal security scenario; while state
police forces remain most reluctant to have anything to do with the
seaward patrolling.
All this is not to say that the government is oblivious of the huge
potential of the maritime sector and its shortcomings. Proof of this
lies in the fact that three successive Ministers of Shipping and
Transport have, in a period of just seven years, issued three ‘maritime
perspective plans’; the latest being ‘Maritime Agenda 2020’, issued in
2010. The common thread that runs through all these plans is their
grandiose concept and unrealistic targets, without any mention of a
roadmap, a time schedule or a monitoring mechanism. Obviously they have
been drawn up to impress the public.
Three major aspects of the civil maritime sector addressed by these
perspective plans are ports, the shipping industry and shipbuilding.
Since all of them impinge either directly or indirectly, on maritime
security I will touch upon them briefly.
Ports and Harbours
The navy is a regular user of all major ports, and resident in many
of them. Naval operations are profoundly affected by the functioning of
these ports, and the navy is often asked for assistance in times of
crisis. In wartime the navy will need to guard them and ensure their
efficient functioning – often in the face of enemy action.
To a mariner, India’s 13 major and 176 minor ports present a
distressing prospect. Badly congested, poorly managed and lacking in
facilities for dredging, mechanization and storage, they are grossly
inadequate to meet the cargo-throughput requirements of our growing
economy. Indian ports stand out in stark contrast when compared with the
efficient cargo handling and quick turn-around times available all over
the Asia-Pacific, including China and even neighbouring Sri Lanka.
The new Maritime Agenda, ambitiously, aims to quadruple cargo
throughput by 2020, but most Indian ports are already operating at close
to 100% capacity and any enhancement will require massive expansion
programmes. Considerable planning and investment would be needed to
bring Indian ports to anywhere near international standards. Moreover,
unless hinterland connectivity in terms of efficient railroad and fast
highway connections are available investment in ports may be rendered
infructuous.
Shipping Industry
A nation’s merchant fleet is yet another strategic asset, and now
crude-oil and natural-gas carriers and container ships are almost as
important as warships in the security matrix. During war, a key
objective of the belligerents will be to deprive the opponent’s industry
of vital raw materials and fuel, and to starve his civilian population
by attacking merchant shipping. Ideally, therefore, the country should
own and control as much of its shipping as possible so that it can
ensure adequate reserves. It would interest you to know that in order to
meet India’s daily need of 3.1 million barrels of oil, at least two
VLCCs (very large crude-carriers) must unload at the Vadinar terminal in
Gujarat every single day of the year.
India’s merchant fleet, 15th largest in the world, has been almost
static, for some years, at 1000 ships totalling 10 million tons. This
fleet can carry less than 10% of our foreign trade, and is not only
woefully inadequate for India’s needs, but also lacks container, product
and specialized carriers. Dependence on foreign shipping means not just
a loss of earnings but also represents a strategic vulnerability.
Considering the fact that the Indian seaborne trade is set to double or
triple by 2020, the Indian shipping tonnage needs to be speedily
augmented in order to arrest further decline in the share of Indian
ships.
Our most spectacular failure has, however, been in the field of shipbuilding.
Shipbuilding
While the basic driver of shipbuilding is global seaborne trade, it
is a strategic industry which an emerging power like India has been
gravely remiss in not nurturing. Apart from constituting the foundation
and support of a nation’s naval power, the shipbuilding industry
generates huge secondary and tertiary benefits in terms of ancillary
industries, skilled manpower and employment creation, which can
transform the economy.
Of all the Indian flagged merchant vessels, just over 10% have been
built in Indian shipyards; because of higher costs, lengthy delivery
periods and, sometimes, due to indifferent quality. Countries like
China, South Korea, Japan and even Vietnam and the Philippines have,
marshaled their strengths to create a shipbuilding industry which
produces quality ships at competitive prices. While these nations have
monopolized the world’s ship-building market, it is a measure of India’s
myopic vision that we have failed to capitalize on our many natural
advantages and to create a dynamic shipbuilding and ship-repair
industry.
Indian shipyards contribute just 1% of the global market share. The
target of achieving 5% share of global shipbuilding in next seven years
set by the Maritime Agenda-2020 is quite unrealistic, because even a
marginal increase capacity will call for a herculean effort; especially
during the current shipping slump. Any endeavour to boost the
shipbuilding industry will require drawing up of a national strategy
which designates shipbuilding as a priority sector and provides active
support in terms of levies, financial subsidies, and availability of raw
materials and training of manpower.
So much about civil shipbuilding, but what ails our defence shipyards?
After all, of India’s 28 shipyards (China has over 800) eight are owned
by the MoD.
What Ails the Defence Shipyards?
No nation has ever become a maritime power by importing naval
hardware from abroad, and competent warship building shipyards are the
sine qua non for achieving ascendancy at sea. In their long-term vision
of creating a competent maritime force, India’s naval leadership has
remained steadfast in their resolve to have it built in Indian
shipyards; even in the face of acute scepticism. Regrettably, this
commitment to indigenization has not been reciprocated by the industry
with equal passion.
The public sector work-culture has kept the efficiency and
productivity of these shipyards at dismal levels. Most warship building
projects have been afflicted by huge time delays and embarrassing cost
overruns. This has not only had an adverse impact on the navy’s
force-levels but also eroded its credibility with the Ministry of
Finance. These yards, under the tight control of the Department of
Defence Production are not funded to undertake modernization or
up-gradation. Nor are they encouraged to demonstrate commercial,
financial or technical innovation, and they would all benefit from
adoption of modern technical practices and human resource management
methods.
The real cause for serious concern relates to the tendency which
makes us declare that a newly delivered warship is, for example,
‘75%-80% indigenous’. While some may consider this an acceptable piece
of public-relations hyperbole, such statements actually cause grave harm
because they lull us into complacency. The truth of the matter is that
the propulsion, weapons, sensors, electronics and many other systems
that go into every warship, that we build indigenously, are either
imported or assembled in India under licence. Therefore the chances are
that the ship may actually be 75%-80% imported by value!
Seabed Exploration
The last issue I want to mention, in passing, is that of seabed
exploration. India is the owner of a huge EEZ, and was granted status of
a ‘pioneer investor’ in a large patch of Indian Ocean by the
International Seabed Authority as early as in 1987. The seabed promises
to yield vast resources of mineral wealth, embedded in poly-metallic
nodules, which lie on the ocean floor.
Unfortunately, India’s Department of Ocean Development and now
Ministry of Earth Sciences has dabbled perfunctorily in seabed research.
On the other hand, China has established a huge lead in the area of
seabed exploration technology by producing the world’s deepest diving
vehicle which can go down to 7000 meters. If information about the
presence of strategic rare-earth metals on the seabed is true, India
needs to accelerate its own programmes so that it is not left too far
behind.
Against this, somewhat gloomy but realistic backdrop, let me now
shift gears and provide a brief glimpse of the strategic challenges that
we are likely to face in the foreseeable future, their maritime
implications, and how well equipped we are going to be to deal with
them.
Maritime Challenges
India’s main strategic challenge comes from its prosperous northern
neighbour; China. Without entering into a detailed discussion about
respective capabilities and intentions, it can be said that China and
India, are going to make uneasy neighbours. For the two nuclear-armed
nations to rise, almost simultaneously, without conflict will require
either adroit diplomacy or a miracle; possibly both. The all weather
Sino-Pakistan alliance, with its strong anti-Indian slant, further
complicates our security problems.
The Kashmir and Sino-Indian border disputes, although far from the
sea, could have maritime repercussions if India attempts to employ
countervailing strategies in the Indian Ocean. Our cautious and hesitant
reaction to border intrusions by both China and Pakistan, earlier this
year, raised questions about India’s political resolve and military
preparedness in the face of repeated provocations. The incidents also
conveyed the warning that we need to be prepared for collusive action by
both armies. To exacerbate India’s security predicament, the Pak
Army-ISI combine awaits the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan to
unleash its strategic reserve of Taliban on Kashmir.
Within the Sino-Indian strategic equation, the maritime dimension is a
relatively new factor. The rapid growth of both economies has led to
increasing reliance on energy and raw materials, and transported by sea.
This has focused sharp attention on the criticality, for both
economies, of uninterrupted use of the sea- lanes for trade and energy
transportation. Thus, while the PLA Navy makes forays into the Indian
Ocean, the IN has newfound commitments in the South China Sea.
The seas around us are rife with hazards and uncertainties; whether
it is rampant piracy, maritime terrorism, and proliferation or
inter-state tensions. Natural disasters and the impact of climate
change, too, present a severe threat to coastal nations and low-lying
islands in our region. After its sterling performance during the 2004
tsunami, it will be the unstated expectation of our neighbours that the
IN will promptly come to their assistance in times of natural calamity.
Against this backdrop, and given the trans-national reach and
versatility of maritime power, not only is the IN going to find greater
salience in India’s national security matrix, but will also play a
vital role in sustaining India’s economic prosperity. India’s long-term
maritime roadmap, therefore, requires special focus on three vital
factors.
The navy’s biggest challenge is going to be the timely replacement
of ageing platforms and obsolescent equipment. The envisaged order of
battle of about 150-170 ships and submarines, and possibly 250-300
aircraft assumes certain delivery rates from shipyards and aircraft
factories; which they seem incapable of meeting. At the same time, our
other major source, of hardware, the Russians, have brazenly reneged on
costs as well as delivery schedules, in violation of solemn agreements.
One of the more serious challenges before the navy’s leadership will be
to persuade the Russians as well as Indian DPSUs to deliver on time and
within cost.
The failure to acquire even a reasonable level of self-reliance in
major weapon systems in the past 66 years has made India the biggest
importer of arms world-wide; and this must count as a failure of the
DRDO and DPSUs. Crafting a viable and time-bound strategy which will
persuade the DRDO to develop, reverse-engineer or import the technology
for weapons and sensors for our indigenously built warships will
constitute another major challenge for the IN.
China’s pursuit of a, so called, ‘string of pearls’ strategy tends
to draw considerable attention in strategic circles due to its
high-profile economic connotations. While India may not be able to match
China’s financial munificence, the navy’s ‘foreign cooperation’
initiatives have ensured creation of a favourable maritime environment
in the region. Apart from activities such as exercises,
joint-patrolling, port calls and flag-showing deployments, the navy’s
out-reach also includes provision of maritime security on request by
neighbours. Agreements exist with almost all IOR countries that permit
IN ships, submarines and aircraft to avail of refueling and turn-around
facilities at very short notice.
Maritime Game-changers
Against this background, there is expectation that the IN could tilt
the balance in the South Asian power-game. While a Maritime Strategy is
in place, given India’s current national security outlook, the crafting
of a cohesive national strategy appears an unlikely prospect.
Nevertheless some aspects of the Navy’s force-accretion plans, which
will endow the nation with a number of powerful maritime capabilities,
bear mention here.
- Intense maritime activity in the Indian Ocean and the huge area
that has to be kept under surveillance requires substantial
reconnaissance and anti-submarine capabilities. The expected advent of
the PLA Navy, especially its nuclear submarines, into the Indian Ocean
will lend urgency to the maritime domain awareness (MDA) task. The IN
has evolved a multi layered surveillance capability with deployment of
task-optimised aircraft, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles for each
layer. The ‘icing on the cake’ is the recently launched GSAT-7
communication satellite, meant exclusively for IN use, which will
facilitate the networking of sensor and weapon data across its vast
footprint.
- The arrival INS Vikramaditya, with its complement of MiG-29K
fighters and Kamov-28/31 helicopters, will boost the navy’s capability
to exercise sea-control and to project power over the shore. Current
plans envisage a second (and perhaps third) indigenously-built carrier
joining the fleet in the 10-15 years. Given the wealth of carrier
operating experience available in the IN, these ships are capable of
tilting the balance of power in our region.
- Operationalization of the SSBN Ariihant will ensure that India has
an invulnerable 2nd strike capability; thus enhancing the effectiveness
and credibility of its nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis adversaries; China
and Pakistan. As the Service responsible for safe and efficient conduct
of SSBN operations, the IN will also be custodian of their
nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, thus enhancing its status and
importance in the national security totem-pole.
- The induction of the nuclear-powered attack-submarine (SSN) INS
Chakra has placed a powerful weapon of offence and sea-denial in the
hands of the IN. Unlike warships which remain vulnerable to detection
and attack from all three dimensions, a SSN on patrol vanishes from
sight; to reappear as the deadly nemesis of ships and submarines. Apart
from the anti-shipping role it can also undertake, with virtual
impunity, tasks as varied as surveillance, special-operations,
intelligence-gathering and land-attack.
Conclusion
As a former naval person I feel that a strong and balanced navy is
vital for India’s march towards major power status. Such a force will
soon be a reality; largely through the navy’s foresight and indigenous
efforts. However, it is necessary for the decision-makers to understand
that the navy, by itself, constitutes just one pillar of the country’s
maritime capability, and without the rest of the structure, including
strategic guidance, to complement and provide support, the edifice of
naval power will remain hollow and vulnerable.
Asian countries which have brought holistic focus on their maritime
sector have not only reaped tremendous economic benefits but also
reinforced their maritime security. While the neighbourhood has moved
on, India’s ports and infrastructure remain inefficient, our
shipbuilding industry is sluggish, merchant shipping grows at snail’s
pace, seabed exploitation is stagnating, and human resource development
is inadequate. Our trade-dependent economic progress is undergirded by
these essential components of maritime power, but a lack of strategic
vision has resulted in failure to exploit the maritime sector; with
adverse implications for maritime security.
A nation with India’s maritime assets, challenges and opportunities
urgently needs a multi-disciplinary maritime advisory body to
conceptualize a vision, draw up plans and monitor activities in the
maritime domain. The first task of such a body should be to craft an
overarching Maritime Security Policy and thereafter to undertake its
integration with India’s Maritime Strategy. Only such a synergy can
ensure that we draw maximum advantage from the maritime sector - to
benefit our economy and also to reinforce maritime security.
That concludes my presentation and I thank you for your attention. Jai Hind.
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