Persisting challenges
On the face of it, the improvement in the balance of payments data during the second quarter of this year compared to earlier reporting periods looks nothing less than spectacular. According to the RBI, India’s current account deficit (CAD) narrowed sharply to $5.2 billion (1.2 per cent of GDP) in the second quarter from $21 billion (5.0 per cent) during the corresponding period last year. It was also much lower than the 4.9 per cent in the first quarter. The sharp fall is attributed to a contraction in the trade deficit to $33.3 billion from $47.8 billion a year ago. Merchandise exports picked up while imports, especially of gold, moderated. Exports increased by 11.9 per cent to $81.2 billion on the back of significant growth in leather and textile exports. On the other hand merchandise imports at $114.5 billion recorded a steeper decline of 4.8 per cent on a year on year basis. Gold imports fell steeply to $3.9 billion compared to $16.4 billion in the preceding quarter and $11.1 billion a year ago.
Indisputably, some deft policy moves aided by some fortuitous circumstances have made the external economy look much stronger than it was barely three months ago. The gyrations in the rupee-dollar exchange rate say it all. The free fall of the rupee in August was both the cause and the consequence of prevailing macroeconomic uncertainty. It exposed in no uncertain terms the perils of overdependence on short-term capital flows to fund the current account. This is amply reflected in the latest BOP data: net portfolio investment outflows were of the order of $6.6 billion, almost matching the inflows under foreign direct investment. Altogether in the first half of the year, reserves were down by more than $10 billion despite the vast improvement in the CAD. The rupee’s path towards relative stability since then reflects, above all, a considerable improvement in the external economy. The RBI’s unconventional measures to shore up the rupee, such as through opening a separate window for oil companies, have also helped. Exports have received a major fillip in the wake of the rupee’s depreciation. But the narrowing of the CAD is also due to continued weakness in non-gold, non-oil imports. Any acceleration in growth will push up the import bill of these items. Finally, government policies might have sharply curtailed gold imports but the underlying demand for gold remains, and indications are that it will be met through smuggling. The battle for securing the current account on a more permanent basis is far from over.
Posturing over airspace
China’s move to implement an Air Defence Identification Zone in the East China Sea has sparked concern among its eastern neighbours and the United States. That the ADIZ so marked includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands — whose ownership is contested by China and Japan — has riled Japan and the U.S., prompting Washington to send B-52 bombers over the Zone. China admittedly is well within its rights to demarcate such an ADIZ. Air defence identification zones serve as buffer airspace for countries, extending in some cases beyond territorial waters. It is the prerogative of littoral states to determine how they should respond to civilian or military aircraft entering an ADIZ. The U.S. and Canada have identified air defence zones that cover hundreds of miles beyond their territorial seas — the U.S., however, maintains that only military aircraft are required to inform the authorities while crossing this space and that too if they intend to fly towards the mainland. India has marked six such zones hugging its coastline, with stringent clearance requirements for all aircraft entering them. Whether China has unilaterally implemented an ADIZ is inconsequential and it is conceivable that air defence zones of neighbouring countries may overlap. Japan, for instance, identified an ADIZ bordering Taiwan earlier this year without consulting Taipei, stoking a controversy.
The question, then, is not one of legality but propriety. Some directives contained in China’s ADIZ announcement were rather alarming. China’s announcement that its “armed forces would adopt defensive emergency measures” — presumably going well beyond identification or interception — against non-cooperating aircraft, was problematic especially in the light of a standing dispute over some territories in the Zone. The Chinese government may have intended to remind the U.S. that it is the dominant power in the region. Yet ironically, this episode has brought the U.S. and its allies together in a huddle. Beijing must also now contend with its increasingly vocal nationalist constituency that has been demanding “countermeasures” against violating aircraft. The U.S. too must desist from creating further friction in the region. After an initial display of bravado in sending bomber planes over the ADIZ, the U.S. has asked its commercial aircraft to “operate consistent with notices to airmen issued by foreign countries.” China should now respond in kind and assuage the legitimate concerns of its Asian neighbours. The Chinese Defence Ministry’s clarification that the “Zone does not aim at any specific country or target, nor does it constitute a threat to any country or region,” is a welcome measure.
Dim hope for the Sumatran tiger
Indonesia might conjure up idyllic images of families of orangutans gambolling amidst lush tropical rainforest, but the reality is starkly different. Aerial photographs of the once-densely forested islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan (Borneo) reveal large tracts of bald, scarred earth, and investigations undertaken by environmental organisations like Greenpeace unearth orangutan graveyards where the skulls and remains of these apes lie scattered like debris.
Every one of the country’s once abundant megafauna — the tiger, the rhinoceros, the elephant and the orangutan — is today classified as critically endangered. The main cause of the dramatic whittling down in the numbers of these animals is not poaching as much as the ravaging of their habitat — Indonesia’s forests — by mining, pulp paper interests, and most specially, by the palm oil industry.
While there is disagreement about the exact rate of deforestation in Indonesia, it is amongst the highest in the world. In 2008, the country was listed by the Guinness World Records for having the fastest rate of deforestation globally. New studies supporting similar claims abound. Just last month, a report in the journal, Science , claimed that while Indonesia lost some 10,000 square kilometres of forest every year between 2000 and 2003, this number rose sharply to 20,000 sq.km per annum between 2011 and 2012.
Political will in conservation
The Indonesian authorities dispute these findings, insisting that deforestation has largely been arrested from a high of 35,000 sq.km a year between 1996 and 2003, to around 4,500 sq.km per year, more recently.
But regardless of what figures one plumps for, some facts are well established. The World Wildlife Fund Indonesia’s Tiger and Elephant species programme coordinator, Dr. Sunarto, says that the island of Sumatra has lost more than two-thirds of its natural lowland forest — the most suitable habitat for elephants and tigers — over the past 25 years. As a result, elephant numbers have approximately halved from an estimated 5,000, to between 2,400 and 2,800, during the same period.
Tigers, which once roamed the island, have now become effectively marooned on a few disconnected national parks and are on the verge of disappearing. Indonesia has already lost two species of tigers, the Javan and Bali tigers, and there is real concern that the last remaining species, the Sumatran tiger, is set to follow suit. In the 1970s, there were around 1,000 Sumatran tigers in the wild, but today less than 400-500 survive. Dr. Sunarto contrasts this dwindling with India, where the 300 Royal Bengal tigers recorded in 1973 have since swelled to around 1,500. He credits the efforts of the Indian government in setting up “Project Tiger,” indicating a political will that he claims is lacking in Indonesia.
Whether this political will is either as strong or as efficacious as presumed by tiger conservationists in Indonesia is debatable, but even if one were to concede the point, India’s role in Indonesia’s fight against the extinction of its megafauna is far from that of a straightforward model to be emulated.
Indian import of palm oil
India is in fact the world’s largest importer of palm oil, the very resource which is behind much of the habitat destruction that threatens Indonesia’s large mammals. According to Greenpeace, the palm oil sector was the single largest driver of deforestation in the 2009–2011 period, with identified concessions accounting for about a quarter of forest loss. Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of palm oil and the industry accounts for 11 per cent of Indonesia’s export earnings, second only to oil and gas.
India overtook China in 2009 to emerge as the top importer of palm oil and currently accounts for about 19 per cent of the global trade. Burgeoning Indian demand, which has doubled in recent years, is one of the primary driving forces behind the overall boom in palm oil production which reached 50 million tonnes in 2012, almost double the amount produced a decade earlier.
Palm oil is used as cheap cooking oil in a variety of processed foods and in a range of cosmetics. So, whenever a young woman reaches for a bright new shade of lipstick at a make-up counter of a shop in Mumbai, or a call centre in Bangalore orders in a big batch of baked goods as an office treat, it is quite likely that these seemingly innocent actions contribute to the environmental devastation being wrought in Indonesia.
The number of Indian companies that import and use palm oil in their products is vast, and includes big names like Godrej, Emami, Adani Wilmar and VVF Ltd. In a report, Frying the Forest , released last year, Greenpeace demonstrated how Indian companies like Ruchi Soya bought oil from known environmental offenders, like Indonesia’s Duta Palma. A palm oil growing and exporting group, Duta Palma has repeatedly been found to be in violation of Indonesian laws, including operating without a concession title, illegal clearance of deep peatlands and intentional burning of forests to make way for oil palm plantations.
Sustainable standards
According to Avimuktesh Bharadwaj, forest campaigner with Greenpeace India, no Indian company has yet committed publicly to sourcing palm oil from guaranteed zero deforestation sources. Adani Wilmar is on record stating that sustainable palm oil “at competitive prices” is “inaccessible” in India due to the lack of procurement infrastructure. The only company to respond directly to the Frying the Forest report was Godrej, which reiterated its adherence to Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) standards.
The RSPO is a voluntary palm oil industry body formed in 2004 with the objective of promoting the growth and use of sustainable oil palm products. An estimated 40 per cent of global palm oil production and use is accounted for by RSPO members. RSPO standards have however been widely criticised for not doing enough to prevent environmental destruction.
Until this year, they did not prohibit clearances of peatland, for example. Moreover, these standards are known to be regularly flouted by a number of RSPO producers. Crucially, the issue of third-party supply is not addressed, so that members can freely trade palm oil with non-members that have made no sustainability commitments at all.
Some significant policy initiatives to stem this environmental destruction have been forthcoming, such as a two-year moratorium on forest-clearing concessions announced in 2011 and extended for an additional two years, earlier this year. However, the moratorium excludes concessions leased before May 2011, and does not protect secondary forests.
Deforestation, both legal and illegal, continues apace despite promises and policies, driven by the powerful commercial logic of palm oil demand and supply. Ultimately, the survival of the tiger among other fauna in Indonesia is contingent on not just better national laws, but on consumers in countries like India realising the link between their chocolates and face cream and the destruction these products engender in geographically distant places. For the Sumatran tiger, this is at best, a dim hope.
Tigers, which once roamed across Sumatra, have now become effectively marooned on a few disconnected national parks and are on the verge of disappearing
No justice in the end
The Warsaw negotiations delivered little on climate change issues but the fortnight served as a warning about the perilous task that lies before countries to produce a global compact by 2015 which matches expectations.
The developed countries reached Warsaw empty-handed. There were three expectations from them. Primarily, developing countries wanted to see them give a timeline for the delivery of the already committed annual $100-billion kitty starting 2020. Instead, the developed countries came looking to improve the investment climate in developing countries for their green technologies. Then, there was an expectation that they would allow the setting up of a separate channel of fund flows for vulnerable countries that suffer loss and damage from inevitable climate change. Again, the move was stonewalled. It took the moral authority of some countries to get a face-saver on this count. A third asking of the rich nations was to build trust that they would up their existing pledges to reduce emissions between now and 2020. Instead, they asked that emission reduction actions — undertaken outside the U.N. climate convention which do not follow the principles of the convention to be taken account of.
The shirking on the part of the developed world ensured that the Durban coalition stitched by the European Union along with the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) began to come undone.
The Small Island States, with all the moral voice at their command, had failed in two years to convince their senior partners — on whom they are also economically dependant — to deliver. Their inability to hold the developed countries accountable was again on show in Warsaw when they keeled over quickly in the endgame on their demand for a midterm target for finance. In fact the Philippines, a vocal member of the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), advocating the adherence to the principle of equity, took over the mantle of the “moral voice” in the climate talks. For several years the AOSIS, claiming urgency, had demanded action even at the cost of ignoring existing, unmet obligations of the rich world. The takeover was visible in the way the vociferous civil society altered its position too. AOSIS, on the other hand, had to partially come back to the G77 fold to find solidarity for their Loss and Damage agenda, and in return support the Brazilian proposal asking for acknowledging historical emissions.
Battle over 2015 agreement
Very early in the talks it became evident that the real battle in Warsaw would ensue over the move to set up the basic framework for the agreement which is to be signed in 2015 at Paris and to become operational from 2020.
The developed countries were keen that the basic framework for the 2015 agreement put together at Warsaw ensures that the existing distribution of burden between developing and developed economies would not remain so in the new regime. The irony was not lost when they used the phrase “equity” to do so, giving it a whole new meaning even as they tried to shift their existing obligations to the post-2020 new regime which would inevitably require the burden to be spread over emerging economies. Till two years ago, the same developed countries had negotiated to marginalise references to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and relegated the principle of “equity” to a discussion topic for workshops. South Africa, which had initially backed this new notion of equity — and had moved considerably away from the BASIC countries in the last three years — came back to also reinforce the principles of the convention at Warsaw. The Brazilian move backed by the G77, including the LDC, the AOSIS and the Africa Group, to account for historical emissions in the negotiations, was blocked by the developed countries. Instead, some of the same developed countries proffered an index of sorts to “equitably” share the burden of emission reduction under the post-2020 regime. The outright rejection of the Brazilian proposal made it evident that eventually, the key parameter of “historical emissions” would find little or no space in this new index rendering any conceptual idea of an equity reference framework iniquitous in application.
The negotiations have for long run on a lack of trust but at Warsaw they spelt bad faith with the developed countries rather brazenly using their “domestic economic conditions” to shift the burden of providing finance and technology, transfer their mitigation actions into a new regime and then try to make the new regime as symmetrically applicable to all as possible. The U.S. and its close allies did so more blatantly while the EU used more sophisticated language to shift its share of the existing burden into the post-2020 regime.
By the end of the fortnight, the countries that the U.N. climate convention had for two decades tasked to show leadership in fighting climate change only showed negotiating skill to make the world await a post-2020 regime which would more or less forget both science and history. By trying to hitch the developing countries to take on commitments in a post-2020 framework sans historical emissions and after having transferred their existing burden to the future, the distrust grew as the talks turned more into one about economic competition. The BASIC countries came together to protect their economic and atmospheric space. The game drew down to the level that the developed countries refused to use the phrase “commitments” for their actions unless developing countries did so too. In this race to the lowest common denominator, all countries eventually decided that they would “contribute” their actions towards the 2015 agreement — an ominous sign that the new agreement may lack the ambition required to cut the emissions to requisite levels.
Beholden to the developed world
In this battle where the rich world does not want to be the leader on climate change any more, and has forced the emerging economies to defend their economic and atmospheric space, the AOSIS, the Africa group and the LDCs face the most difficult time ahead. The economic and political dependence of many of these countries on the developed nations locks them into a geopolitical position of weakness. They need to decide if they seek ambition at anyone’s cost or through a path of equity. It is difficult at the moment to see how the developed world will find the appetite to lead the battle against climate change in the next two years when they have only engaged in a diplomatic game to whittle down their role since 2009. In such an atmosphere, it would be only tougher to convince the emerging economies, to further reduce emissions and to act beyond their short-term self-determined economic, energy and environmental interests. Asking them to do more under the present circumstances is the equivalent of asking the emerging economies to pay for their future possible “crimes” while asking everyone to forget the actual crimes committed till date. The framework being built since 2009 for the 2015 deal misses the key ingredient for an ambitious deal at the moment — justice. It’s being replaced by a dubious ingredient, called “fairness.”
As a consequence, the negotiations have delivered empty new shells in the name of finance and technology to the developing world and repackaged existing financial commitments towards the poor countries in a green-coloured envelope (called the Fast-start finance). To prevent the 2015 agreement from meeting a similar fate, the global community needs to ensure that the principle of equity is also not hollowed out by the time the negotiators, ministers and heads of states leave Paris in 2015. Or, the new compact would end up being the legal justification for the race to the least inconvenient ambition.
nitin.sethi@thehindu.co.in
The Warsaw negotiations have delivered empty new shells in the name of finance and technology to the developing world and repackaged existing financial commitments towards the poor countries in a green-coloured envelope
Understanding Article 370
At the Bharatiya Janata Party’s recent Lalkar rally in Jammu, its prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, called for a debate on Article 370. This is encouraging and suggests that the BJP may be willing to review its absolutist stance on the Article that defines the provisions of the Constitution of India with respect to Jammu and Kashmir. Any meaningful debate on Article 370 must, however, separate myth from reality and fact from fiction. My purpose here is to respond to the five main questions that have already been raised in the incipient debate.
Why it was incorporated
First, why was Article 370 inserted in the Constitution? Or as the great poet and thinker, Maulana Hasrat Mohini, asked in the Constituent Assembly on October 17, 1949: “Why this discrimination please?” The answer was given by Nehru’s confidant, the wise but misunderstood Thanjavur Brahmin, Gopalaswami Ayyangar (Minister without portfolio in the first Union Cabinet, a former Diwan to Maharajah Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, and the principal drafter of Article 370). Ayyangar argued that for a variety of reasons Kashmir, unlike other princely states, was not yet ripe for integration. India had been at war with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir and while there was a ceasefire, the conditions were still “unusual and abnormal.” Part of the State’s territory was in the hands of “rebels and enemies.”
The involvement of the United Nations brought an international dimension to this conflict, an “entanglement” which would end only when the “Kashmir problem is satisfactorily resolved.” Finally, Ayyangar argued that the “will of the people through the instrument of the [J&K] Constituent Assembly will determine the constitution of the State as well as the sphere of Union jurisdiction over the State.” In sum, there was hope that J&K would one day integrate like other States of the Union (hence the use of the term “temporary provisions” in the title of the Article), but this could happen only when there was real peace and only when the people of the State acquiesced to such an arrangement.
Second, did Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel oppose Article 370? To reduce the Nehru-Patel relationship to Manichean terms is to caricature history, and this is equally true of their attitude towards Jammu and Kashmir. Nehru was undoubtedly idealistic and romantic about Kashmir. He wrote: “Like some supremely beautiful woman, whose beauty is almost impersonal and above human desire, such was Kashmir in all its feminine beauty of river and valley...” Patel had a much more earthy and pragmatic view and — as his masterly integration of princely states demonstrated — little time for capricious state leaders or their separatist tendencies.
But while Ayyangar negotiated — with Nehru’s backing — the substance and scope of Article 370 with Sheikh Abdullah and other members from J&K in the Constituent Assembly (including Mirza Afzal Beg and Maulana Masoodi), Patel was very much in the loop. And while Patel was deeply sceptical of a “state becoming part of India” and not “recognising ... [India’s] fundamental rights and directive principles of State policy,” he was aware of, and a party to, the final outcome on Article 370.
Negotiations
Indeed, the synergy that Patel and Nehru brought to governing India is evident in the negotiations over Article 370. Consider this. In October 1949, there was a tense standoff between Sheikh Abdullah and Ayyangar over parts of Article 370 (or Article 306A as it was known during the drafting stage). Nehru was in the United States, where — addressing members of the U.S. Congress — he said: “Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral.” Meanwhile, Ayyangar was struggling with the Sheikh, and later even threatened to resign from the Constituent Assembly. “You have left me even more distressed than I have been since I received your last letter … I feel weighted with the responsibility of finding a solution for the difficulties that, after Panditji left for America ... have been created … without adequate excuse,” he wrote to the Sheikh on October 15. And who did Ayyangar turn to, in this crisis with the Sheikh, while Nehru was abroad? None other than the Sardar himself. Patel, of course, was not enamoured by the Sheikh, who he thought kept changing course. He wrote to Ayyangar: “Whenever Sheikh Sahib wishes to back out, he always confronts us with his duty to the people.” But it was Patel finally who managed the crisis and navigated most of the amendments sought of the Sheikh through the Congress party and the Constituent Assembly to ensure that Article 370 became part of the Indian Constitution.
Third, is Article 370 still intact in its original form? One of the biggest myths is the belief that the “autonomy” as envisaged in the Constituent Assembly is intact. A series of Presidential Orders has eroded Article 370 substantially. While the 1950 Presidential Order and the Delhi Agreement of 1952 defined the scope and substance of the relationship between the Centre and the State with the support of the Sheikh, the subsequent series of Presidential Orders have made most Union laws applicable to the State. In fact today the autonomy enjoyed by the State is a shadow of its former self, and there is virtually no institution of the Republic of India that does not include J&K within its scope and jurisdiction. The only substantial differences from many other States relate to permanent residents and their rights; the non-applicability of Emergency provisions on the grounds of “internal disturbance” without the concurrence of the State; and the name and boundaries of the State, which cannot be altered without the consent of its legislature. Remember J&K is not unique; there are special provisions for several States which are listed in Article 371 and Articles 371-A to 371-I.
Fourth, can Article 370 be revoked unilaterally? Clause 3 of Article 370 is clear. The President may, by public notification, declare that this Article shall cease to be operative but only on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State. In other words, Article 370 can be revoked only if a new Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir is convened and is willing to recommend its revocation. Of course, Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution to change this provision. But this could be subject to a judicial review which may find that this clause is a basic feature of the relationship between the State and the Centre and cannot, therefore, be amended.
Gender bias?
Fifth, is Article 370 a source of gender bias in disqualifying women from the State of property rights? Article 370 itself is gender neutral, but the definition of Permanent Residents in the State Constitution — based on the notifications issued in April 1927 and June 1932 during the Maharajah’s rule — was thought to be discriminatory. The 1927 notification included an explanatory note which said: “The wife or a widow of the State Subject … shall acquire the status of her husband as State Subject of the same Class as her Husband, so long as she resides in the State and does not leave the State for permanent residence outside the State.” This was widely interpreted as suggesting also that a woman from the State who marries outside the State would lose her status as a State subject. However, in a landmark judgement, in October 2002, the full bench of J&K High Court, with one judge dissenting, held that the daughter of a permanent resident of the State will not lose her permanent resident status on marrying a person who is not a permanent resident, and will enjoy all rights, including property rights.
Finally, has Article 370 strengthened separatist tendencies in J&K? Article 370 was and is about providing space, in matters of governance, to the people of a State who felt deeply vulnerable about their identity and insecure about the future. It was about empowering people, making people feel that they belong, and about increasing the accountability of public institutions and services. Article 370 is synonymous with decentralisation and devolution of power, phrases that have been on the charter of virtually every political party in India. There is no contradiction between wanting J&K to be part of the national mainstream and the State’s desire for self-governance as envisioned in the Article.
Separatism grows when people feel disconnected from the structures of power and the process of policy formulation; in contrast, devolution ensures popular participation in the running of the polity. It can be reasonably argued that it is the erosion of Article 370 and not its creation which has aggravated separatist tendencies in the State. Not surprisingly, at the opposition conclave in Srinagar in 1982, leaders of virtually all national parties, including past and present allies of the BJP, declared that the “special constitutional status of J&K under Article 370 should be preserved and protected in letter and spirit.” A review of its policy on Article 370, through an informed debate, would align today’s BJP with the considered and reflective approach on J&K articulated by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Only then would the slogans of Jhumuriyat , Kashmiriyat and Insaniyat make real sense.
(Amitabh Mattoo is Director, Australia India Institute, Professor of International Relations, University of Melbourne and Jawaharlal Nehru University.)
Article 370 was and is about providing space, in matters of governance, to the people of a State who felt deeply vulnerable about their identity and insecure about the future.
‘Court can interfere with election process’
The Delhi High Court has observed that court can interfere with election process in extraordinary circumstances.
A Division Bench of Justices B.D. Ahmed and Vibhu Bakhru made this observation while directing a Single Bench to hear afresh a suit challenging amendments to the Delhi High Court Bar Association (DHCBA) election rules without following the procedure.
The Single Bench had dismissed the suit filed by the former president of the Delhi Bar Association of Tis Hazari district courts here, Rajiv Khosla, saying the plaintiff had approached the court after the DHCBA election was notified for December 13.
But the Division Bench said: “We are of the view that the learned single judge was under a mistaken impression that under no circumstances could an election be interfered with once the election process had been set in motion.”
“… ordinarily the court does not interfere with the election process. That is, indeed, the overwhelming trend of court decisions. But, that does not mean that even in extraordinary circumstances, the court cannot interfere, particularly, with elections to bodies such as bar associations, which do not involve Article 329(b).” The Article says, “No election to either House of Parliament or either House of the Legislature shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature.”
The Division Bench also directed the Single Bench to “consider whether this is a case which is of such an extraordinary character where interference with the election process is called for?”
DoT making inventory of networks for switch to IPv6
Injecting a sense of urgency in Tamil Nadu government departments is the main challenge
The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has started compiling an inventory of all computer networks used by government departments, State and Central public sector undertakings and banks across Tamil Nadu for finalising a plan for transition to the next generation Internet address, IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6).
The list will segregate the entire network architecture in these organisations into computer equipment, servers, switches and routers that will only require reconfiguring or minor tweaking of hardware-software to make them IPv6-enabled, and gear that need replacement.
The DoT’s road map envisaged complete migration to IPv6 by 2017-end as the address capacity of IPv4 had been exhausted. Besides freeing up space for more Internet users, the other benefits of the move to IPv6 include better quality of service for consumers, support for high-end applications and better security features. It is also proposed that the actual migration work will adopt a dual stack that will support both IPv4 and IPv6 platforms.
“The inventory will provide clarity on what the cost estimate will be for each stakeholder. In any case, our surmise is that the investment will be not too huge for a stakeholder” said D. Thamizhmani, Director, DoT’s Network and Technologies Cell, Chennai, mandated to oversee the migration.
Though the DoT had instructed government organisations to come up with a detailed transition plan by December, 2013, it is now obvious that this deadline will be missed in most of the States, including Tamil Nadu. The DoT’s Network and Technologies Cell (NT Cell) has been engaged in holding consultations and awareness workshops among stakeholders such as government departments, PSUs, banks, telecom companies and Internet Service Providers.
In Tamil Nadu, the DoT Cell is dealing with 300 stakeholders, including 137 State departments/PSUs, 50 Central PSUs and 27 banks. Though the Cell is also addressing telecom companies and Internet Service Providers, they are reckoned to be in a better state of preparedness for the changeover.
At the moment though, even a large telecom company like BSNL is yet to activate the migration process. “We are yet to identify equipment that will need an upgrade,” said a spokesperson for BSNL Chennai Telephones, which has network infrastructure catering to more than a million mobile users and about 4 lakh broadband connections.
DoT officials say the main challenge is to inject a sense of urgency in State government departments, especially as there is no imminent threat of a computer shutdown as was the case with Y2K.
At a recent workshop held by the DoT, only half the 80-odd government departments were present. At the workshop, led by R.M. Agarwal, Deputy Director General, DoT, Delhi, IT Principal Secretary T.K. Ramachandran said he hoped that similar sessions would be held for all departments that were not represented.
DoT officials are optimistic that the inventory will be ready by March-April, based on which a transition plan can be worked out.
As per the DoT’s time line for migration, the public interface of all government projects for delivery of citizen-centric services should be on dual stack supporting IPv4 and IPv6 traffic latest by January 1, 2015.
