Aircraft carriers, despite their great cost, have
always been seen as strategically important by the Indian Navy due to
what must be a misplaced sense of grandeur. Today, they are seen as
vital for India to establish a naval presence as a world power, even as
they have lost their signifi cance elsewhere.
Atul Bhardwaj (
atul.beret@gmail.com) is ICSSR Senior Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi.
On 21 February 1946, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi wrote to G E B Abbey,
private secretary to the viceroy, Archibald Wavell, suggesting that the
small and medium sized vessels of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) be
converted for the purpose of fishing to provide an additional source of
food supply to meet the food crisis in India.
1
This was the time when RIN mutiny was at its peak and vice admiral J H
Godfrey, the flag officer commanding, RIN announced on the All India
Radio that he would blow up the very navy he was commanding, if the
striking ratings did not surrender. It was from such deep internal
crisis that independent India’s navy emerged to launch its quest to be a
blue water fleet. The direct influence of British officers (vice
admiral S H Carlill was the last British Chief of the India Navy) on
Indian Navy lasted till 1958. However, the intellectual imprints of
British admiralty have ensured that the 21st century Indian Navy
continues to rely on carrier battle groups (CBG) as the lynchpin of its
maritime strategy.
The fading away of the old British aircraft carrier (INS Viraat
likely to be decommissioned in 2018) and the commissioning of Russian
made 44,570 tonne INS Vikramaditya (R33), and the likely induction of
indigenously built 37,000- tonne INS Vikrant by 2018 represent a
symbolic coming of age for the Indian Navy.
2 The twin
carriers are expected to serve the navy for the next 40 years. The fleet
may see a probable addition of another 65,000-tonne indigenous vessel
after a gap of 10 years or so.
Despite the impressive numbers, one remains sceptical about the
strategic thought behind the Indian Navy’s perspective planning. The
only visible novelty in Indian naval thought is the use of postmodern
symbolism to sell its modernisation plans to the public at large. Till a
few years ago, the navigation track of a warship at sea was a highly
guarded secret. In the age of transparency, the full electronic track of
R33, from Russia to India, is now available on social media for the
military-machine enthusiasts to speculate on all the minor and bold
alterations of courses ordered by the command.
However, what is more crucial is that despite the decline in
universal appeal of aircraft carriers, they continue to be the “queen
ship” of the Indian Navy. Over the past half a century, besides laying
the foundation of the Indian naval air arm, the two ex-British carriers
have given India no tactical or strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean.
In fact, the history of the aircraft carrier purchases by India clearly
suggests that they were bought for considerations other than the
strategic.
Misplaced Ambitions
In 1956, when India decided to buy the redundant British light fleet
carrier HMS Hercules, there was neither any justification nor any reason
for a nine-year-old infant nation to catapult itself to great power
status by spending precious foreign exchange in times of extreme food
shortages in the country.
3 The cost of the old English
carrier was close to one instalment (£50 million or Rs 65 crore) of what
the British had promised to pay the Indians under the Indo-British
sterling agreement.
4 Interestingly, the Indian Navy’s
aircraft carrier dreams were drawing funds from the Second Five-Year
Plan that had envisaged a foreign exchange shortfall of Rs 11,000
million and was looking at raising Rs 1,000 million through new private
foreign investment (Tyson 1956: 123).
The mid-1950s was the time when India was demanding the delinking of
the rupee from the plummeting sterling and converting the £542 million
Indian sterling reserves into dollars. Fearing damage to the
international role of the sterling, the Bank of England and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer pleaded with India to refrain from taking
any drastic step. It is in this period of financial stress that both
India and Britain initiated the Gnat fighter and aircraft carrier deals
(Anderson 1999: 269).
Perhaps the only solace was that India was not the only third world
nation on which an old aircraft carrier was being dumped. Debt-ridden
nations – Argentina, Brazil and Thailand were the other gullible buyers
in late 1950s and early 1960s.
India’s second aircraft carrier INS Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes) came along
with British Sea Harrier aircraft. The deal for Harriers for the Indian
Navy had started as early as 1970s (Krishnappa 1972: 1862, 63).
In
1972, the British aerospace industry as well as their government
pitched for the sale of 100 Sea Harriers to the Chinese (Crane 1981:
227-50).
The Chinese who had a more urgent strategic
requirement of getting Margaret Thatcher to sign an agreement for return
of Hong Kong indulged the British till 1979 and finally refused to buy
the Harriers. India had no substantial aim vis-à-vis Britain, yet,
misplaced ambitions of grandeur led New Delhi to inadvertently pay for
Thatcher’s extravagance in 1982 Falklands war through the purchase of
Hermes and Harriers.
The third Indian carrier, INS Vikramaditya, was built by the Soviets
towards the fag end of the Cold War. The dissolution of Soviet Union and
the declining Russian stature in international politics in the Boris
Yeltsin era made the Russian distaste for aircraft carriers even more
pronounced. The Russians offered the raw platform to the Indians free of
cost. The deal was signed with the Russians in 2004.
The Indian naval planners’ dogmatic allegiance to aircraft carriers
has led to the refurbishment of Vikramaditya at a cost of $2.33 billion.
Such spending is being justified in terms of India’s growing economic
reach and the global gaze shifting to the Asia-Pacific region. According
to Kaplan, of late, a greater interest is being evinced in the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR).
5 The European interest in IOR is being
fuelled “as a result of what is perceived to be a growing mixture of
shiny gunboats, new naval stations and geopolitical intrigue among
countries of the IOR such as India, China, the United States and Iran”
(Botez 2012: 369). Admiral (retd) Arun Prakash posits, “The surge of
interest in the Indian IOR, of which India is a major geographical
constituent, is
a new phenomenon.”
6 Some Chinese scholars see “a
progressively assertive India, setting the pace of the impending
maritime rivalries among the great powers” (Yoshiyara 2012: 489).
Contradicting the Chinese, former naval chief, admiral Sureesh Mehta
feels that India “lacks strategic thinking in terms of maritime affairs,
and also paucity of planning to counter Chinese moves in the IOR”.
7
This growing mismatch between the Indian and Chinese perceptions of
maritime security in the IOR is being aided and exploited by the
America’s “Asia pivot” and their resolve to maintain their predominance
in the region.
Current Debates
The current debates based on booming Indian economic might and
intensification of competition with China are indicative of a fresh urge
among the maritime strategists to resurrect Mahanian concepts of sea
power and naval strategy (Mohan 2012). What is discernible in these
trends is that there is a growing salience of strategic theories that
are pushing India to look beyond their borders, and move into a global
arena using their sea power. As a former naval officer says,
Earlier India’s naval strategy was focused on its ability to defend
its territorial waters and the accompanying Exclusive Economic Zone. But
the expansion of India’s maritime interests has seen an increase in the
area of interest/influence extend`ing from Suez to South China Seas,
instead of earlier Aden to Malacaa (Ghosh 2013).
The advocates of a Realist foreign policy see Indian Navy’s proactive
operations in IOR and South China Sea as an instrument to achieve great
power status for India (Pant 2012). The key tenets of Realist thought
on Indian maritime security are: (1) maritime security is intrinsically
linked to trade and commerce; (2) the impact of national sea power is
best felt beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ); (3) the Indian Navy
should be the net security provider in the IOR; (4) naval bases on
foreign territory are a must to exercise sea power; and (5) the Indian
Navy is the foremost instrument of Indian military diplomacy.
This seeming theoretical clarity is largely based on western
scholarship on maritime affairs. Behind such formulations is a belief
that the next stage of capitalist development in India and China will
lead to imperialism – a competition for colonies. And since
historically, force at sea has been a quintessential ingredient for any
imperial powers, therefore, India must be a sea power to be a great
power. Such delusions of grandeur lie behind the borrowed strategic
themes as “out of area operations”, cooperative security at sea and the
support they render to the concept of aircraft carrier as the bulwark of
Indian naval strategy.
Subsidising the Imperium
However, what is normally overlooked is that theories which are
applicable for truly great sea powers like the US may not fit the medium
power requirements. The reach and range of American maritime assets
places it in an absolutely different league. Despite this common
knowledge, naval planners continue to insist on making Indian Navy a
miniaturised version of the US navy. Fifty years ago, India paid to bail
out England, and now, once again, India is digging deep into its
pockets to sustain the dwindling fortunes of the falling American
Empire.
In the next couple of decades, India is not likely to reach a stage
where it would be able to exercise any maritime adventure on its own
steam – position its CBG to launch its fighters for firing missiles on
enemy land from the sea. Operating any aircraft carrier in close
proximity to enemy territory enhances its vulnerability manifold.
Establishing sea control even for a limited time of period is a
difficult proposition in the age of sophisticated submarines and
nano-technology. Therefore, the only option for the Indian Navy to use
its costly carrier and its organic air is to operate under guidance and
cover of the US military diplomacy, a proposition that would not only
curtail strategic autonomy, but create conditions for the Indian fleet
to be constantly in tow of the US fleet.
It is now well established that the US navy is shrinking under the
burden of budget cuts. To obviate this difficulty, the US wants to
broaden its military alliance base beyond the Atlantic. The game plan as
enunciated by US military strategist Thomas Barnet is
We want to administer the global security system, not rule it. Like
those ‘system administrators’ that keep the Internet up and running,
America needs to play system administrator to the global security
network. We need to keep globalisation up and running – to be, in
effect, its bodyguard.
Rekindling the imperial desires of France, Japan and the Indian elite
is part of the global security structure envisaged by the US.
The Indian strategy disregards facts and relies on theories that make
it don an oversized jacket designed to fit an imperial power.
Strategies for medium powers need not always rely on marrying military
means with political objectives. The problem arises because conventional
strategists are preoccupied with “use of force” and its calibration to
achieve national objectives. This assumes that the state’s monopoly over
means of violence is absolute and the only restraining factor is the
adversary’s military strength. Therefore, adroit management of limited
wars or threat of use of force is considered to be the lynchpin of
strategy.
It is such thinking that makes costly platforms like aircraft
carriers look attractive national weapons and disregard all military
lessons that a medium power like India must learn from the experience of
invaded nations. What prevented the sophisticated, modern military
machines in Iraq and Libya from offering resistance against their
invaders is a question that needs to be studied in greater
detail. Spending money on techniques to penetrate no-fly zones created
by a big power and jamming the incoming missiles of an invading airpower
should be the strategic imperative rather than splurging money on
gaining a false sense of prestige.