The Conference of Parties-19 held in Norway in November 2013 ended with an announcement of a sum of around $280 million pledged by certain developed countries for a “results-based” payment system to take forward the programme of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. This article examines what this means for climate change mitigation in the forest context, and what it probably means to India, specifically.
P J Dilip Kumar (
pjdilip@gmail.com) retired as the Director General of Forests, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India and is currently a senior fellow of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi.
At the end of the Conference of Parties-19 (CoP-19) during November 2013 at Warsaw, Poland, the United Nations-Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD) organisation put out an eulogistic announcement of a sum of around $280 million pledged by certain developed countries (United Kingdom, United States, Norway, Germany) for a “results-based” payment system for REDD in 48 partner countries (India not being among them). The delegates made glowing statements about how great a breakthrough this was, and how it vindicated years of effort to arrive at a consensus and an action plan to take the programme of REDD (Plus) forward. This article attempts to tease out what this means for climate change mitigation in the forest context, and what it probably means to India, specifically. It should be of interest to the climate change interlocutors, policymakers, researchers, and especially, the Forest Services of India and of developing countries in general.
Principle of REDD (Plus)
The basic idea of REDD (Plus) appears to be simple enough. It starts from the understanding that deforestation and forest degradation in tropical regions (the DD in the acronym REDD) constitute the second largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, contributing from 12% to 20% on average, which of course, lead to an increase in world temperatures and the irreversible effects of climate change.1 The more the carbon dioxide (CO2) in the air, the faster vegetation can grow, and therefore, forestry is seen as a potentially significant low-cost mitigation device, both by simply reducing the rates of deforestation or degradation, and by actively encouraging growth of new crops to mop up the extra carbon in the atmosphere: REDD. It is seen as a “low-hanging fruit” since trees are considered to grow quite easily by themselves, over long time-periods, and on marginal and degraded lands, with a number of accompanying advantages or “co-benefits” such as soil and water conservation, temperature reduction in adjoining lands, increase in humidity, and production of materials to support local livelihoods, agriculture, and the requirements of energy, fodder, natural foods and medicines, and so on. One estimate suggested, for instance, that it will cost around $17 to $33 billion per year to halve the net global carbon emissions from forests by 2030 (Eliasch quoted in Angelsen 2008, p 41). Therefore, there has been a growing pressure to include forestry, and forest protection and improvement in the list of climate mitigation strategies to be supported financially by the world community. But difficult problems in identifying, measuring, and valuing such efforts have long stymied the large-scale adoption of this option, in contrast to the other measures such as reducing emissions and improving efficiency through better technology: the $280 million promised in Warsaw at the end of last year (November 2013) seems negligible in comparison with the estimated requirement of many billions, and it is anybody’s guess how and to whom even this relatively small quantum will be disbursed in practice.
Forestry as a route to carbon mitigation was first introduced in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) CoP-3 in 1997, as an option to reduce GHGs from Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) in 2006, countries agreed on four global objectives, as follows (in paraphrased form): (1) to reverse loss of forest cover through sustainable forest management (SFM), including protection, restoration afforestation, preventing degradation of forest; (2) to enhance forest-based economic, social and environmental benefits, including livelihoods; (3) to increase significantly the area of protected forests worldwide and other areas of SFM, as well as the proportion of forest products coming from SFM areas; and (4) to reverse the decline in official overseas development assistance (ODA, or foreign aid) for SFM.
In 2005, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) was introduced at the UNFCCC CoP-11, subsequently enhanced to REDD by including forest degradation. In CoP-13 at Bali (2007), this was further expanded to REDD (Plus), by adding elements of forest conservation and SFM, at the instance of countries like India that presumably argued that they had already controlled the DD in REDD, and now wanted to be rewarded for the ongoing good forest practices (for being “good boys”, in a sense), as the existing concept seemed to give an undeserved reward to the negligent. The concept of REDD (Plus) was incorporated in the Bali Action Plan, in the expectation that countries would be paid for the carbon sequestered by them at the cost of short-term benefits from otherwise exploiting their forests in an unsustainable manner.
The devil, they say, is in the details, and the REDD (Plus) mechanism has been bogged down by seemingly intractable problems of definition, identification, measurement, and the difficulty of ensuring long-term contractual agreements (permanence). Many questions remain: how do we measure reductions in emissions; should it be in a country as a whole or in a part of it; how can the REDD mechanism be funded; should it be by funds directly given by the world intergovernmental bodies or by market mechanisms (trading of carbon credits, for instance); how to rule out the possibility of leakages (the contracting party collects the payments, then goes and quietly liquidates the crop or allows it to deteriorate); or worse, how to account for the displacement of forest degradation to other locations (the front yard is kept clean, but there is something else going on in the backyard); how to make sure that the poor are not unfairly penalised (their lands and commons are taken over by the state or by companies to grow carbon crops)? Thus, much of the work so far has been on developing methods and procedures for measuring, verifying, and so on, rather than on actually raising carbon crops on the ground.
Scenario in India
What is the situation in India in the context of REDD or REDD (Plus)? India already has in place a robust and comprehensive policy and legal framework and administrative structures. It also has institutions for forest conservation and sustainable forest management. In fact, it was in India, and certain other colonies, that the British developed the concepts and institutions that we now know as organised sustained yield forestry. After Independence, these were carried over and continued with little change, and in fact, the protective framework has only been strengthened with the addition of the Forest Conservation Act (1980), Wildlife Protection Act (1972), the Environment Protection Act (1986), and so on. The National Forest Policy (1988) is also aimed at maintaining the environment and ecology first, then on meeting the material needs of the communities living in and around the forest, and the production of industrial products for the larger economy comes last.
There has been criticism that the forest reservation and style of administration in India have been harsh on tribals and forest-dependent communities, and the Forest Rights Act (2006) has been enacted as a corrective, to set right the historical injustices done to the forest tribes, giving them back a degree of ownership and control. Thus, the existing legal and policy framework covers most of the concerns of the international community both on the environmental/ecological side and the human rights/indigenous communities side, and there is little that REDD or any other mechanism would have to add by way of improved governance.
The relevance of REDD to India is further called into question by the probability that the basic premises on which it is based do not actually apply here. Consider the reported figures of the contribution of GHG carbon by different sectors in recent periods. If we look at gross forest cover in recent times, as per the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) State of the World’s Forests reports, while the overall world figure registered a 0.13% per annum decrease over the period 2000-10, India has recorded a net increase of 0.5% per annum, and south Asia as a whole has had a 0.3% rate of increase (FAO 2011). East Asia has done even better, with a 1.2% per annum growth in forest cover, China alone showing an increase of 1.6% per annum. Overall, the Asia-Pacific region showed a 0.19% increase per annum, and it was south-east Asia, with a decrease of 0.4% per annum, that was contributing to forest loss.
Similarly, Latin America and the Caribbean showed a decrease of 0.46% per annum, Africa a decrease of 0.49% per annum, but Europe an increase of 0.07% per annum, and North America an increase of 0.03% in forest cover. Thus, it is apparent that the whole rationale for REDD breaks down when we consider India (or China), which have already undertaken vigorous corrective action (India traditionally over a century and a half, China more recently to reverse a period of excess clearance of forest during the Maoist heydays).
The rate of DD seems to be (inversely) related to the extent of forest cover, with countries like Brazil having a huge forest area covering 62% of its 519 million hectares (ha) (and a loss of 0.5% per annum), Indonesia having 52% of its 94 million ha under forest (loss rate 0.5% a year), Malaysia 62% under forest (loss rate 0.5% per year), whereas India and China have only 21%-22% under forest (and have stabilised the forest area). We may hazard a guess that countries like Brazil and Indonesia will be driven to draw down the forest cover in order to find space for a growing population, and to realise the wealth locked up in the old-growth forests, and the question before the world community looking for forest conservation is mainly related to the strategies that will work in these forest-rich regions of the globe. Here, of course, the forest-rich country concerned may well ask, what the world is prepared to pay to keep these forests intact.
If we look at the reported figures of actual GHG emissions for India, as reported by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF 2012) in their Second National Communication to the UNFCCC, once again it appears that the forests are not really contributing much through DD (keeping in mind, always, that there may be deficiencies or limitations in the data and the assumptions). Thus, just as an illustration, in 2007, it is reported that of the total country levels of CO2emissions (14,76,357 Gg, or million tonnes) and removals (2,75,358 Gg), forest alone contributed 87,840 Gg emission, 67,800 Gg removals, which obviously is minuscule compared to the overall figures, and nowhere near the 20% contribution of GHG from forest degradation which is the basic assumption of the REDD regime.
REDD Financing and India
Thus, whether we look at gross area levels of forest cover, or actual emissions, the forest sector in India is actually doing very well, and there seems to be little scope for REDD-type interventions that have not already been taken by the country in the normal course. This is significant, because REDD payments are supposed to be made only for incremental effort (or results), and to assess this, we are supposed to have a baseline which reflects the levels of carbon emissions in the “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario, and then superimpose the levels after REDD-type interventions; credit will be given only for the net improvement.
For India (and China), therefore, the BAU scenario would have already improving levels, and it would be difficult to ascribe changes to any additional REDD interventions. Even if we were to consider support to fresh plantations or other investments to sequester carbon, the fact is that India has already started implementing a massive and ambitious Green India Mission (one of eight climate change missions), with a hypothetical outlay of Rs 45,000 crore over 10 years or about $7.5 billion assuming an average Rs 60 to a dollar, around the amount in the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA fund), and hence even here there is little scope for linking incremental efforts at carbon sequestration to REDD financing. In other words, the REDD framework is skewed in favour of the poor performers and smaller countries, which is a subtle form of international redistribution, which also bedevils concepts like payment for ecological services (PES), and any such mechanisms which purport to compare with – and without – scenarios to decide entitlements.
The overall level of finances itself is seen to be laughably low, even compared with the country’s domestic resources under any scenario.2 Countries like India (and China) are therefore not likely to be recipients of any significant funding from whatever sources are scraped together by the international community for this purpose. Indeed, if India as a country can seriously consider putting up a statue at a cost of Rs 2,500 crore to honour a freedom fighter and iconic national figure, the world community cannot be faulted on this ground. Even if any funds are provided, they will most probably go to small experiments by non-governmental actors (organisations or communities) and for capacity-building, which would obviously again support mainly international consultants.3 So the Indian government, especially the forest service, need not be unduly exercised about the REDD finances and disbursement mechanisms.
Much is made of the possibilities of market mechanisms for carbon sequestration, whereby developed countries or corporations may try to meet legal requirements to offset their carbon footprint by buying certified carbon credits worldwide. Apart from the obvious problems in discovering and certifying such credits, considering the cost-benefit calculus of private operators, it may seem that a carbon credit of, say, $5 per tonne (which would also amount to $5 a hectare per year, based on the productivity of marginal lands), would be minuscule compared to what the owner could get by, say, clearing the timber, selling his land to a developer, or mining the coal under his land. There seems to be no sensible correlation at all in the hopeful carbon credit calculations even in comparison to the investment needed to raise a tree crop, which is of the order of Rs 50,000 to 1,00,000 a hectare, so that a carbon credit of $5 (which is equal to a maximum of $50 if capitalised at 10% interest for a perpetual annuity), may not be enough to dissuade the landowner from cutting his crop well before physical maturity.4
The only aspect which may be of potential interest to the forest services in India (and China) may be their role in building the capacity of other stakeholders and actors, developing measurement and verification procedures, setting up or managing certification institutions, and so on. In other words, they could plug into the service provider role, on par with international agencies and consultants, rather than thinking of themselves as potential recipients of international doles for forest conservation (which they are anyway bound to do as per the existing mandate). India and China are now such big and robust economies that they have to really come out of their dependent thinking, and instead, start contributing to address the residual problems in other parts of the world, with technical and process support, and can contribute even some financial assistance.
One of the other issues that the forest services may need to address urgently is the waning of public confidence in the government. This is, of course, a worldwide phenomenon, and to some extent, is funnelled by the rising presence of NGOs, which are attractive to highly educated, articulate young offsprings of the middle class, as they combine the power to influence without a concomitant responsibility.
Hence, rather than bother about meeting requirements of a hypothetical REDD regime of international finance (very little of which will come in the way of government, if at all), the forest services perhaps ought to be looking at the type of institutions and processes that REDD and other international declarations and conventions are advancing. The forest services should perhaps be looking at ways to make their dealings with the public less unpleasant (that includes interaction with poor clients like artisan groups, tribal communities, and so on) and more efficient: by putting out more information, by training their staff better, by using information and communications technology better, instituting transparent and efficient procurement procedures, and of course, trying to make things easier for private growers and sellers of forest products. As the UN-REDD website states:5
The programme’s environmental gains are designed to be socially equitable, as a key focus of UN-REDD is the inclusion and empowerment of indigenous peoples and civil society organisations.
‘One of UN-REDD’s most important achievements has been to put safeguards in place for the engagement of indigenous communities, to ensure their full and effective participation in governance’, said Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, founder and executive director of Tebtebba Foundation and the former chair of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.
The Joint Forest Management regime built up by the foresters in India6 is a grand achievement (although academics tend to dismiss it as a “failure” just because it does not achieve all imaginable social and political goals), and this would be the right direction for the forest departments to proceed. There is also the onerous challenge of responding to the Forest Rights Act, which has confused the distinction of forest from non-forest, and made the forest department’s role ambiguous. Such concerns are not directly to do with carbon sequestration and climate change, but they do form a significant part of the broader forest governance issues that are being increasingly integrated into the international discourse on forests and conservation.7
Notes
1 Needless to say, there is a huge body of literature on the subject of climate change, such as the UNFCCC documents, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change documents, and the recent World Bank (2013); see Angelsen (2008) for a relatively painless summary of REDD. The Energy and Resources Institute in India has also produced some papers that reflect a conventional approach to REDD. TERI (2009) and TERI (nd).
2 Consider, for instance, that India has already accumulated some Rs 30,000 crore or roughly $5 billion in its CAMPA (compensatory afforestation) fund from user agencies, which is being doled out to the states at the conservative pace of Rs 1,000 crore per annum.
3 As far as we can make out from an internet search, apparently only two small community-based projects were in operation in a state in the north-east of India, supported by an international NGO, and even these projects are apparently coming to an end.
4 Commercial crops are often harvested at four or five years to maximise financial returns.
5 “The UN-REDD Programme receives $40 million pledge from Norway to help 48 developing countries halt deforestation”, Press release, available at:
http://www.un-redd.org/COP19 PressRelease/tabid/131427/Default.aspx
6 Some 1,25,000 village forest committees have been set up covering 23 million hectares of forest, most of them at the level of hamlets and small settlements. There appears to be a correlation with this programme and the general improvement in forest cover and fire protection over the last two decades.
7 These are the “co-benefits” that REDD looks for, in consonance with such international human rights instruments as: The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, cf, the CIFOR publication on REDD (Angelsen 2008), p 115.
