But it will take some effort from both sides
Narendra Modi’s election as prime minister will be another epochal turn
in India’s ongoing democratic experiment. The elevation of a staunch
Hindu nationalist, who is also a rank outsider to politics in New Delhi,
only confirms the public’s disenchantment with the UPA government.
Mr Modi’s rise has been watched closely by India’s friends abroad,
especially those chagrined by its failure to play the confident role
they had expected. Nowhere have these expectations been dashed more
grievously than in the United States.
Whatever else may be believed about Mr Modi, all are agreed that he is a
decisive leader. That such an individual will head India now raises new
hope that U.S.-Indian relations may be rejuvenated.
Obviously, engagement will not come easily. The revocation of Mr Modi’s
U.S visa in 2005, provoked by allegations of his role in the 2002
Gujarat riots, was personally bruising for him. The prospect for
dramatically resuscitating bilateral ties, therefore, looks less than
promising.
The Obama administration, however, has sought to signal its willingness
to let bygones be bygones, declaring that it “look[s] forward to
engagement with the new government.”
But this overture is unlikely to win Mr Modi’s heart and mind absent a
public American expression of regret for the visa revocation or an open
personal welcome to the United States.
It is politically impossible for Washington to do the former, and it is
unlikely that the latter would happen before the election results are
clear. How much of a difference post-election felicitations would make
to Mr Modi, however, is uncertain.
Policy paradigm
The bottom line is that Washington and Modi have got off on the wrong
foot. While it is nevertheless doubtful that he would go out of his way
to spite the United States, he will not ingratiate himself with
Washington either.
If bilateral relations receive a boost in these circumstances, it will
only be because Mr Modi takes certain actions that, although benefiting
the United States, are intended primarily to advance Indian interests.
Dr Manmohan Singh’s deep commitment to transforming U.S.-Indian
relations lost momentum during his second term due largely to the
downturn in India’s economic policies (and fortunes) and a slowing in
defense and strategic cooperation. Mr Modi will likely alter Indian
policies for the better in both areas.
If his record in Gujarat is anything to go by, Mr Modi will encourage
greater private initiative in combating India’s economic problems and
will seek to improve its investment climate.
To the degree that India’s economy picks up steam, U.S. national
interests are well-served. Bilateral trade and investment as well as
profitability will increase, cushioning the current trade-related
problems. If India’s economic strength and political confidence grow,
U.S. strategic aims in Asia are advanced.
There are, however, lurking dangers as well. Mr Modi’s ascension has
revived fears that India’s minorities may face elevated threats. Were
Gujarat-type riots to repeat themselves, the risks to U.S.-Indian
relations would be great.
But there is reason to believe that Mr Modi is unlikely to provoke any
divisiveness that undermines his larger economic and political
ambitions: he wants India to succeed so that he can stay in power—for a
long time. But high economic growth and acute national unrest generally
don’t go together.
Pakistan problem
India-Pakistan relations offer other risks. But international observers
should not suppose that Modi will automatically favour violent responses
to Pakistan in the event of a crisis. The larger danger is that,
distracted by the economy, Mr Modi will ignore Islamabad, creating
incentives for Pakistan’s “deep state” to rely more heavily on jihadi
groups to get his attention.
Because such eventualities represent the most serious threat to U.S.
interests in South Asia today, the Obama administration ought to reach
out publicly and generously to Modi upon his election. Whatever his
present misgivings, Modi will realize upon taking office that a fruitful
relationship with the United States serves India’s interests and vice
versa; he should therefore be prepared to pursue a robust cooperation
agenda, using the next Strategic Dialogue to prove the point.
Sustaining the bilateral relationship is important to both countries,
but will require sensitivity and dexterity on each other’s part. Only
genuine reciprocity can slowly correct what could otherwise become a
productive yet joyless relationship between Washington and New Delhi.
(Ashley J. Tellis is Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
Keywords: Obama, Modi, India-US ties, 2014 Lok Sabha Elections
