UGC not getting meaningful proposals from researchers, says Vice-Chairman
The University Grants Commission (UGC) would soon
introduce a new review system to ensure accountability in handling
grants, projects and research funds, said Vice-Chairman H.Devaraj.
Delivering
the 31st convocation address at the Bharathidasan University here on
Tuesday, Mr.Devaraj said the apex body had been funding liberally to the
universities across the country under various
heads, including research
projects. The universities were accountable for the grants and funds
allocated to them, he said. The UGC has been working on a new review
system to verify the utility of the funds. Once operational, this would
bring in some improvement in the usage of funds by these institutions,
he said.
Stating that funds were not an issue,
Mr.Devaraj said the UGC was not getting meaningful proposals from the
researchers. Many universities and institutes already possessed good
infrastructure and equipment. They had good human resources too.
However, there was a need to fine-tune these resources to suit the
present-day requirements.
To transform universities
into world class institutes, the UGC was conferring the universities
with Universities with Potential for Excellence (UPE) status. As many as
15 universities had been accorded the UPE status during the 9th and
10th plan period. It had been proposed to accord the status to 10 more
universities during the 12th plan period. Four universities in Tamil
Nadu, including Bharathidasan University, have been shortlisted for the
status. Mr.Devaraj exuded hope that the universities would make good use
of the opportunity. Though the country had witnessed a spectacular
expansion in the field of higher education, the growth had been
accompanied by problems, including proliferation of substandard
institutions, dilution of quality, outdated curricula, lack of
accountability, and poor management. Tremendous efforts would have to be
made to rectify the situation. Stating that the Bharathidasan
University was looking forward to make a presentation to get the UPE
status, V.M.Muthukumar, Vice Chancellor, said it would make all efforts
to get the honour. With three new colleges coming under its fold, the
number of colleges affiliated to the university had gone up to 138, he
said.
K.Rosaiah, Governor, gave away degrees to graduates. P.Palaniappan, Minister for Higher Education, spoke.
A fortnightly column on the high politics of the Af-Pak region, the fulcrum of global power play in India’s neighbourhood.
Reviving the long-dead proposal for a zone of peace in the Indian
Ocean, as suggested by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval earlier this
month, is not the answer to the new maritime challenges that confront
India. Multilateral diplomacy is an important but minor part of a new
Indian Ocean strategy that New Delhi needs to develop. The core of such a
strategy is about building India’s own naval strength and expanding its
maritime partnerships with other countries through bilateral,
trilateral and multilateral means.
In the past, when India saw itself as a weak, non-aligned state,
Delhi believed the nation’s security dilemmas could be addressed through
moralpolitik. This approach created severe problems for the nation’s
security decision-makers. When China tested its first nuclear weapon in
1964, for example, India ran to the United Nations seeking a treaty that
would abolish nuclear weapons.
Instead, India got the non-proliferation treaty, which only prevented
the spread of these weapons. Rather than build a nuclear arsenal, India
spent the next three-and-a-half decades denouncing the NPT and
proclaiming a commitment to nuclear disarmament. Similarly, India
believed that the UN would provide answers to a historic shift in its
maritime environment — the withdrawal of Great Britain from east of the
Suez after nearly two centuries of dominance over the Indian Ocean. As
America replaced Britain as the dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean
and its rival Soviet Union sought to compete, Delhi backed Colombo’s
proposal for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.
Delhi contested the very idea of a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean
and bet that the region could build a system of collective security.
India asked the great powers not to acquire military bases in the
region. It also told Washington and Moscow, “by the way, don’t even
think of bringing your nuclear weapons into the Indian Ocean”.
If Delhi’s strategic innocence in the 1960s was breathtaking, some of
its neighbours, like Pakistan, thought India was being simply devious;
they believed Delhi wanted great powers out of the Indian Ocean so that
it could establish its own dominance. So much for the consequences of
Indian idealism. Irrespective of their lip service for the zone of
peace, most Indian Ocean states actively sought military support from
one or the other external power to counter presumed threats from their
neighbours. That world has not disappeared.
Maritime China
Doval’s invocation of the zone of peace proposal is widely seen as an
Indian counter to China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Delhi has noted with concern the recent docking of Chinese naval
submarines in Colombo and watched warily as the Chinese navy matched
India’s fresh water diplomacy in the Maldives. India’s rhetoric about
keeping extra-regional powers out of the Indian Ocean was directed at
America in the 1970s and 1980s. As India has expanded its interaction
with the US military since the early 1990s, some of that rhetoric had
taken a backseat.
As China eyes the Indian Ocean, Delhi is playing the old song again.
But that little ditty is not going to limit China’s rising naval profile
in the Indian Ocean. After it first showed up in the Indian Ocean three
decades ago, the Chinese navy is here to stay. Like all great powers
before, Beijing is bound to establish a permanent military presence in
the Indian Ocean. The question is not “if” but “when”.
Indian Response
To cope with the rise of China and the changing power balance in the
Indian Ocean, Delhi needs to look beyond the outdated zone of peace
proposal. India’s ocean diplomacy needs a strong domestic foundation,
built on more rapid naval modernisation, the expansion of civilian
maritime infrastructure, development of island territories, capacity to
undertake projects in other countries across the littoral and more
vigorous naval assistance to other countries.
On the political front, India needs much better political relations
with its maritime neighbours like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, which are
playing the China card as an insurance against hostile Indian policies.
Delhi also needs stronger partnerships with other island states, like
Seychelles and Mauritius, which are being wooed by China with great
vigour today.
India needs to deepen its military security cooperation in the Indian
Ocean with the US and France and initiate a maritime security dialogue
with China. On the foundation of these unilateral and bilateral
initiatives, India can expand its maritime multilateralism through such
initiatives as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium. For all this, Delhi needs the civilian leadership —
both political and bureaucratic — in the defence ministry to wake up to
the new imperatives of maritime strategy and naval diplomacy.
- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-great-game-folio-ocean-diplomacy/99/#sthash.iuaqEfbJ.dpuf
A fortnightly column on the high politics of the Af-Pak region, the fulcrum of global power play in India’s neighbourhood.
Reviving the long-dead proposal for a zone of peace in the Indian
Ocean, as suggested by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval earlier this
month, is not the answer to the new maritime challenges that confront
India. Multilateral diplomacy is an important but minor part of a new
Indian Ocean strategy that New Delhi needs to develop. The core of such a
strategy is about building India’s own naval strength and expanding its
maritime partnerships with other countries through bilateral,
trilateral and multilateral means.
In the past, when India saw itself as a weak, non-aligned state,
Delhi believed the nation’s security dilemmas could be addressed through
moralpolitik. This approach created severe problems for the nation’s
security decision-makers. When China tested its first nuclear weapon in
1964, for example, India ran to the United Nations seeking a treaty that
would abolish nuclear weapons.
Instead, India got the non-proliferation treaty, which only prevented
the spread of these weapons. Rather than build a nuclear arsenal, India
spent the next three-and-a-half decades denouncing the NPT and
proclaiming a commitment to nuclear disarmament. Similarly, India
believed that the UN would provide answers to a historic shift in its
maritime environment — the withdrawal of Great Britain from east of the
Suez after nearly two centuries of dominance over the Indian Ocean. As
America replaced Britain as the dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean
and its rival Soviet Union sought to compete, Delhi backed Colombo’s
proposal for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.
Delhi contested the very idea of a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean
and bet that the region could build a system of collective security.
India asked the great powers not to acquire military bases in the
region. It also told Washington and Moscow, “by the way, don’t even
think of bringing your nuclear weapons into the Indian Ocean”.
If Delhi’s strategic innocence in the 1960s was breathtaking, some of
its neighbours, like Pakistan, thought India was being simply devious;
they believed Delhi wanted great powers out of the Indian Ocean so that
it could establish its own dominance. So much for the consequences of
Indian idealism. Irrespective of their lip service for the zone of
peace, most Indian Ocean states actively sought military support from
one or the other external power to counter presumed threats from their
neighbours. That world has not disappeared.
Maritime China
Doval’s invocation of the zone of peace proposal is widely seen as an
Indian counter to China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Delhi has noted with concern the recent docking of Chinese naval
submarines in Colombo and watched warily as the Chinese navy matched
India’s fresh water diplomacy in the Maldives. India’s rhetoric about
keeping extra-regional powers out of the Indian Ocean was directed at
America in the 1970s and 1980s. As India has expanded its interaction
with the US military since the early 1990s, some of that rhetoric had
taken a backseat.
As China eyes the Indian Ocean, Delhi is playing the old song again.
But that little ditty is not going to limit China’s rising naval profile
in the Indian Ocean. After it first showed up in the Indian Ocean three
decades ago, the Chinese navy is here to stay. Like all great powers
before, Beijing is bound to establish a permanent military presence in
the Indian Ocean. The question is not “if” but “when”.
Indian Response
To cope with the rise of China and the changing power balance in the
Indian Ocean, Delhi needs to look beyond the outdated zone of peace
proposal. India’s ocean diplomacy needs a strong domestic foundation,
built on more rapid naval modernisation, the expansion of civilian
maritime infrastructure, development of island territories, capacity to
undertake projects in other countries across the littoral and more
vigorous naval assistance to other countries.
On the political front, India needs much better political relations
with its maritime neighbours like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, which are
playing the China card as an insurance against hostile Indian policies.
Delhi also needs stronger partnerships with other island states, like
Seychelles and Mauritius, which are being wooed by China with great
vigour today.
India needs to deepen its military security cooperation in the Indian
Ocean with the US and France and initiate a maritime security dialogue
with China. On the foundation of these unilateral and bilateral
initiatives, India can expand its maritime multilateralism through such
initiatives as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium. For all this, Delhi needs the civilian leadership —
both political and bureaucratic — in the defence ministry to wake up to
the new imperatives of maritime strategy and naval diplomacy.
- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-great-game-folio-ocean-diplomacy/99/#sthash.iuaqEfbJ.dpuf
