The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) – a basic building block in
the nuclear disarmament process has remained deadlocked for 18 years
now. The 1996 treaty has so far been signed by 183 states and ratified
by 162 states. Yet, a structural prerequisite of the treaty has held it
hostage from coming into force. Namely, Article XIV of the CTBT, which
stipulates that for the treaty to enter into force the signature and
ratification by all the 44 states possessing nuclear weapons
capabilities and research reactors as listed in Annex 2 is a
prerequisite. The treaty thus awaits signature and
ratification from
India, Pakistan, and North Korea and in addition requires the United
States, China, Israel, Iran and Egypt (which have already signed) to
formally ratify it. Even though it is yet to sign the CTBT, India has
supported the treaty’s basic principle of banning nuclear explosions by
declaring a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. India’s
expressed support to the essential requirement of the treaty makes it a
de facto member of the CTBT. This Issue Brief analyses
India’s stated position on the CTBT and its extent of support to the
treaty in principle.
India’s Stand on CTBT: 1954 to 1998
When the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the CTBT in
September 1996, 2048 nuclear explosions had already been conducted
worldwide. 18 years later, the number of explosions has further increased to 2055.
Given this, the CTBT has an important role to play in ensuring a world
where nuclear weapons tests are barred and thus constrain the
development of new nuclear weapons as well as new nuclear weapon
countries.
India advocated a test ban years before it came into being. Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the first call for an “immediate
standstill” agreement on nuclear testing between the United States and
the former Soviet Union as early as 1954. However, this call was
sabotaged by the nuclear weapons states (NWS) on the ground that it was
“difficult to evolve a fool proof verification system”.
Instead, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom
signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in August 1963. However, the
PTBT, while banning atmospheric, outer space and underwater tests,
permitted underground tests and did not also provide for international
verification. And even as superpower nuclear tests went underground,
China and France, which refused to join the PTBT, continued to conduct
atmospheric tests.
The belief that PTBT would play a crucial role in reversing the
intense arms-race among the NWS was essentially flawed. Since it was
signed, a total of 1372 underground nuclear explosions have been
conducted between 1964 and 2006; this number stands in contrast to the
461 atmospheric and including underwater nuclear tests that were
conducted between 1945 and 1963.
Failure of the PTBT to prevent further nuclear test explosions was
clearly a dampener for the CTBT negotiations. The CTBT,hich sought to
prohibit underground nuclear testing and discontinue nuclear explosions,
lost momentum due to conflicting objectives between the NWS and the
non-nuclear weapons states like India. But this did not weaken the
Indian resolve against nuclear testing and in favour of nuclear
disarmament.
Post the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, an Indian debate began on the
pros and cons of advocating a test ban and nuclear disarmament. At the
same time, driven by security considerations, a small group of nuclear
bomb advocates emerged in the scientific and political communities.
Security considerations received a further fillip during the 1965
India-Pakistan War, which saw China extending not only diplomatic
support to Pakistan but also threatening India with an attack of its
own. These events marked a watershed in India’s nuclear policy. In
November 1965, India embarked upon the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion
Project (SNEP), designed to carry out a peaceful nuclear explosive test
(which was eventually done in 1974) and use that as a foundation for
keeping the nuclear weapons option open. Subsequent developments
including China’s attainment of ballistic missile capability and
America’s attempt to intimidate India during the course of the 1971 War
only reinforced Indian security concerns. Yet, India did not abandon
its goal of nuclear disarmament.
India’s nuclear test ban policy post 1974
Post the 1974 peaceful nuclear test, India maintained a policy of
self-restraint. It did not conduct any follow up tests and the
development of nuclear weapons was temporarily halted. In June 1978,
Prime Minister Morarji Desai once again suggested a ban on nuclear
weapons testing at the Special Session of the UNGA. Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi upheld this position in 1982 by calling for a test-ban
treaty and a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons. Her successor
Rajiv Gandhi put forward an Action Plan in 1988 calling for a halt to
the development of new weapons systems and proposing nuclear
disarmament in a time-bound framework of 22 years. Again, in 1993,
India supported the multilateral negotiations and jointly co-sponsored a
consensus resolution on the CTBT at the UN General Assembly. India
thus consistently supported the view that a CTBT was an essential
element of the disarmament process and it opposed any conduct of
nuclear tests by any state under the garb of safety reasons.
But in 1995 India’s advocacy of a test-ban treaty as an essential
element in the larger process of total nuclear disarmament received a
setback with the indefinite extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) without a simultaneous commitment by the nuclear weapon states on
nuclear disarmament. It is against this backdrop as well as India’s
growing security concerns about Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons capability and the assistance that China has provided in this
regard that India chose to oppose the CTBT in 1996. And driven by these
security considerations, India eventually conducted a series of
nuclear tests in May 1998.5
India’s Stand on CTBT: Post-1998 nuclear tests
Post May 1998, India continued to adopt a flexible position on the CTBT and indicated its willingness to discuss a “
de jure formalization”6
of its voluntary moratorium on future nuclear testing. Principal
Secretary to the Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra stated that “India would
be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings
in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”
However, India remained firm that its support to the CTBT cannot be
expected in any “vacuum” and that it “depended on a series of
reciprocal activities”8 particularly from the NWS.
Despite its reservations on the CTBT, India met the basic
requirements of the treaty by stating on May 27, 1998 that it “will now
observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground
nuclear test explosions.”At the same time, it also indicated its willingness to move towards a
de jure
formalisation of this declaration. The basic obligation of the CTBT
was thus met; to refrain from undertaking nuclear test explosions. This
voluntary declaration was intended to convey to the international
community the seriousness of India’s intent for meaningful engagement.
The government maintained that “subsequent decisions will be taken
after assuring ourselves of the security needs of the country.”
India’s commitment to the conclusion of the CTBT was further evident
from Prime Minster Vajpayee’s September 24, 1998 statement in
Parliament: “India is now engaged in discussions with our key
interlocutors on a range of issues including the CTBT. We are prepared
to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion so that the entry
into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999. We expect
that other countries . . . will also adhere to this Treaty without
condition.”
Further, the Indian position on the CTBT is not in defiance of the
objectives of nuclear disarmament. This was evident from Prime Minister
Vajpayee’s statement in the UNGA in 1998 that “India will not stand in
the way of entry into force of the CTBT.”Thereafter in December 1998 he stated in Parliament that “India remains
committed to converting our voluntary moratorium into a
de jure obligation... [however] this…does not constrain…the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.”This stand marked a new beginning in the CTBT debate. From a position of “not now, not ever”
stated in 1996 when India emphasized that it will not accept the
obligations of an “unequal” test ban treaty, it committed itself on not
blocking the CTBT from coming into force.
CTBT and the India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement
The CTBT debate re-emerged in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement
India signed with the United States on the Civil Nuclear Energy
Cooperation Initiative. The nuclear deal involved reversing the
30-year-old technology denial regime imposed on India in the aftermath
of the peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974. The Indo-US nuclear deal
reversed the US ban and facilitated cooperation in the civil nuclear
energy field. India reciprocated by committing to separate its civil
and military facilities, placing all its civil nuclear facilities under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, working with the
US for the conclusion of an FMCT and continuing its voluntary
moratorium on nuclear testing. That India continued to support the CTBT
in principle was evident from the statement made on December 22, 2005
by the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs that
“India has already stated that it will not stand in the way of the
Entry into Force of the Treaty.”
It is noteworthy that both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led
National Democratic Alliance and the Congress-led United Progressive
Alliance Governments have upheld the commitment on unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing, thus implying the prevailing political
consensus on the issue. Though the Indo-US nuclear deal encountered
intense domestic opposition from the BJP on grounds that the agreement
would eventually restrict India from conducting future nuclear tests,
then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee addressed these
apprehensions by stating "...India has the right to test, others have
the right to react."But at the same time, he also added significantly that India will “continue to bind” itself to the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. And till date India has continued to abide by the moratorium.
1998 nuclear tests: a dud?
In August 2009, K. Santhanam, Project Leader during the Pokhran-II
nuclear tests, declared that the thermonuclear bomb test had been a
fizzle and questioned its yield. He cast doubt on the 1974 test result
as well, which was used as a baseline for the 1998 nuclear explosions.
In the light of this he suggested that India must refrain from signing
the CTBT: “Based upon the seismic measurements and expert opinion from
world over, it is clear that the yield in the thermonuclear device test
was much lower than what was claimed. I think it is well documented
and that is why I assert that India should not rush into signing the
CTBT.''
Santhanam’s observations received considerable attention from within
sections of India’s strategic and political communities. In essence,
it implied that India should not sign the CTBT and keep the option open
for more nuclear tests in future. Yet, India has remained supportive of
a non-discriminatory CTBT that is adhered to by other countries as
specified in Article XIV of the treaty. India continues to abide by a
voluntary and unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. This position has
been upheld consistently in several national and international forums.
Ahead of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, for instance,
India reiterated its commitment to a voluntary unilateral moratorium
on nuclear testing.
And as the Indian Permanent Representative to the Conference on
Disarmament stated, it is India’s commitment to nuclear disarmament
that has led to its adherence to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear
explosive testing till date.
A criticism that is levelled against India is that by linking the CTBT to the nuclear disarmament issue,
New Delhi has prevented the treaty from coming into force. But this
ignores the fact that the CTBT is an integral part of the nuclear
disarmament process and it is a superfluous effort to de-link the two.
The purpose of the CTBT is to steer the world towards a stage where
nuclear weapons capable states refrain from nuclear explosions and move
towards global zero. This goal can be realized only when all nuclear
weapons capable countries champion the real essence of the CTBT. At the
same time, it would also provide the much-needed impetus for the
re-start of the FMCT negotiations that remains deadlocked at the
Conference on Disarmament.
Conclusion
Undeniably, the CTBT is an important element of the nuclear
disarmament process. Apart from its primary objective of preventing
future nuclear explosions, its importance in scientific and civilian
applications is widely acknowledged. The Preparatory Commission for the
test ban treaty – the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO) – is designed to play a significant role in
mitigating disasters by detecting earthquakes and tsunamis. This was
demonstrated by its role during the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear
accident in March 2011. The critical role played by the CTBTO has
influenced several countries including Pakistan into becoming a CTBTO
observer State even though it has not signed the Treaty.
India is already in
de facto observance of the spirit of the Treaty by maintaining its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.
By committing to the Indo-US nuclear agreement, India has further
expressed its principled support to the test-ban treaty. The deal,
which took more than three years of intense diplomatic bargaining and
the investment of huge political capital to reverse years of technology
denial, has provided enormous benefits to India. These include India’s
acceptability as a state with advanced nuclear capability and
international standing as a responsible nuclear weapon power. The deal
has opened up vistas for nuclear commerce as well.
It is noteworthy that in September 2009 a former Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission of India, Anil Kakodkar, stated that “the 1998
tests were fully successful and had achieved in toto their scientific
objectives and the capability to build fission and thermonuclear
weapons with yields up to 200 kt.”
This indicates that there is no need for additional nuclear tests by
India unless of course there is a significant deterioration in its
security environment. If that be so, then India could well reconsider
its current position on signing the CTBT.
