“In theory”, a popular saying goes, “there is no difference between
theory and practice; but in practice there is”. National Security
Advisor Ajit Doval’s recent pitch for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
(IOZOP) at the Galle dialogue in Sri Lanka is a classic example of
theoretical formulations not always meeting the test of practical
utility. In principle, the proposal to declare the Indian Ocean Region
(IOR) as a zone of peace is strikingly apposite. Increasing Chinese
presence and the threat of
PLA-N bases in the IOR, the growing interests
of other major powers (US, UK, Russia, France and Japan) in the
region, and the many Chinese infrastructure projects in the region,
create an imperative for India to actively limit the military maritime
activity of external powers in the region. But attempting to do so
through the IOZOP route will ensure that while no military activity is
ever practically curtailed, Indian influence and credibility in the
region will stand severely eroded.
The trouble with the IOZOP proposal is its flawed premise: that by
simply declaring the region a “Zone of Peace”, foreign military
presence and activity can be effectively halted. Proponents of the
proposal believe that in the absence of military strength and influence
to counter the growing Chinese presence in the region, India should
use the multilateral route to create a consensus for preventing the
military activity of external powers in the region. A study of the past
would, however, disabuse ardent Indian Ocean peaceniks of the efficacy
of such a proposal.
In an op-ed in
The Hindu recently, T.P. Sreenivasan, India’s
representative to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean in the
early 1980s, brought out that the original 1971 proposal of an IOZOP
was not so much about peace and tranquillity in the IOR, as it was
about circumscribing the presence of Western powers in the region. The
Ad Hoc Committee, he points out, considered the various provisions of
the proposal at length but none was found feasible because members
stood bitterly divided on the issues. Most permanent members – except
China – were vehemently opposed to the suggestion of no bases in the
IOR. The littoral and hinterland members, on the other hand, supported
it. “The innumerable problems India has faced on account of the U.N.
resolution and the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean”,
Sreenivasan perceptively points out, “must be recalled before we take
any formal initiative in this regard.”
Opposition to the proposal from the major maritime powers is likely
to arise this time as well, the only difference being that today China
too would likely join the chorus for rejecting the proposal. With
growing Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean, it is almost a given
that Beijing would actively reject any suggestion that seeks to limit
China’s military presence in the Indian Ocean. More worryingly, any
such proposal would be detrimental to India’s own power-projection in
the neighbourhood. Sri Lanka’s original 1971 proposal, as Sreenivasan
points out, was driven not only by the fear of extra-regional military
presence but also by a perceived uneasiness about growing Indian naval
power particularly in the aftermath of the 1971 war when the Indian
Navy had launched an audacious attack on Karachi. In some ways, the
IOZOP was an attempt by Colombo to buy some insurance against any
possible Indian designs on Sri Lanka.
Paradoxically, it is India that has been dichotomous in its security
approach to the Indian Ocean – opposing, on the one hand,
extra-regional military presence and yet depending on US naval power to
underwrite regional security. Expectedly, the response to the revival
of the IOZOP too has been fanciful on many levels. First of all, the
Indian Navy might be a net-security provider in the region but it also
honestly admits to a lack of capacity that renders assistance by other
maritime players in the region a rank imperative. A principal precept
of the Indian Navy’s maritime strategy is cooperative security and
meaningful contributions in this regard have so far come only from the
big naval powers in the region.
Secondly, the real danger from an Indian standpoint is not increased
US interest in the Indian Ocean Region but the lack of it. In the
aftermath of the global financial crisis and the US Pivot to the
Pacific, American interest in the Indian Ocean has been waning. With
the shale revolution, the US is losing interest in the Middle East.
Consequently, its stakes in securing the flow of energy from the Persian
Gulf too have reduced. Regrettably, US naval retrenchment from the
region also means a reduced ability to confront larger threats to peace
and security in West Asia. This is one reason why many other states
are rushing to fill in the vacuum created by the impending American
withdrawal. The UK’s announcement of reviving its maritime presence in
Bahrain needs to be seen in this light.
While London’s decision to reopen its naval base in Manama, Bahrain,
is a cause for worry mainly because it implies further militarisation
of the IOR, the fact is that the Royal Navy never really ceased to be a
presence in the region (the RN has four mine-hunter warships
permanently based at Manama from where British Destroyers and Frigates
in the Gulf are regularly supported). All that UK is now seeking is to
bolster the existing infrastructure at the Port, providing its navy
with a forward operating base that would enable sustained security
operations and the accommodation of its service personnel.
This does not mean that RN ships will be a regular presence in the
broader security affairs of the IOR; much of the heavy-lifting in the
Western and Eastern Indian Ocean will still need to be done by
indigenous powers like India. The Royal Navy’s new base merely implies
the UK’s desire to be able to tend to security hot-spots such as the
Islamic State’s threat to the Middle East and the Levant – areas that
India might have no interest getting involved in. Similarly, France,
Japan and Australia are marginal players in the strategic affairs of
the Indian Ocean, even though each of them contributes substantively to
regional security. Circumscribing their space for operations by
imposing a moratorium on maritime activity and presence is likely to
damage the cause of collective security in the region.
An additional concern is that once a Zone of Peace is declared,
Pakistan might revive its proposal for a denuclearized Indian Ocean – a
proposition first raised in the aftermath of India’s nuclear test in
1974 and one that New Delhi strongly resisted. This could be a
potentially game-changing move that needs to be understood in its
entirety before endorsing a Zone of Peace. Pakistan's nuclear efforts
in the Indian Ocean are motivated solely by the presence of India's
strategic submarine capability (the Arihant). The Pakistan Navy (PN)
does not quite need a ballistic missile capable submarine as it is not
bound by "no-first use" and does not consequently need a survivable
weapon. It, however, feels compelled to counter India's SSBN, which, it
feels, has skewed the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. As a
preliminary measure, the PN has invested in a naval tactical missile
capability, but its aspiration to develop a strategic ballistic missile
capable submarine has not proceeded beyond an expression of intent.
Pakistan would, however, be happy to eschew naval tactical nuclear
weapons if India were to take away its SSBN out of the equation. To
compound matters, New Delhi’s backing of a ZOP in the IOR will leave it
with no moral or political grounds to justify its opposition to a
denuclearised Indian Ocean.
Lastly, while there is anxiety about China’s aggressive tactics in
the South China Sea, many Indian Ocean states are not fully convinced
that the PLA-N’s presence in the IOR poses an active threat to maritime
security. It is highly unlikely – especially against the backdrop of
Beijing’s proposal for a maritime silk road which has received
enthusiastic backing from the Maldives and Sri Lanka – that other
Indian Ocean states would be keen on a ‘ban’ on Chinese naval activity
in the region. Yet, there is an almost universal acknowledgement of
India’s contribution to the security and well-being of smaller Indian
Ocean states (a case in point being the ‘fresh-water’ assistance
recently rendered by the IN to Maldives).
In the event that a ZOP is announced, it is India that will stand to
lose the most because its proposal will be seen as a ‘backdoor’
manoeuvre to limit the Chinese presence and an effective abdication of
leadership and responsibility in the IOR.
