The Bodo areas in Assam are witnessing bloodshed once again. The
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit faction) [NDFB-S] is
alleged to have targeted the
Adivasi settlers in the two
districts of Sonitpur and Kokrajhar, killing nearly 78 and leaving many
seriously injured. It appears that this carnage started in retaliation
to the death of three NDFB (S) cadres during a counter-insurgency
operation conducted by the Mahar Regiment on December 21 against the
outfit’s camp in
the Chirang District along the Assam-Bhutan border.
Information from the ground reveal that the NDFB-S may have targeted
the
Adivasi settlers near the forest areas suspecting them of
providing intelligence about their movement to the counter-insurgency
forces.
The faction is known to have regularly targeted people both from
Bodo and non-Bodo ethnicities on suspicion of being police informants,
like the case of a 16-year old Bodo school girl who was dragged out of
her house, beaten and then shot to death by the NDFB militants in
Dwimugri village on the Indo-Bhutan border in August 2014. The causes
for recurring violence in the Bodo areas are deep-rooted. The
Adivasi
settlers are viewed by the Bodos as slowly establishing a large
presence in the state along with other migrants, thus relegating Bodos
to minority status.
Violent Background
A similar situation had occurred in May 2014 during the Lok Sabha
elections when 41 bodies were discovered in Baska and Kokrajhar
districts. At that time too, the NDFB-S was suspected to be behind the
violence. The non-Bodos, including migrant Muslims, who constitute the
majority, alleged that their failure to vote for the Bodo People’s Front
(BPF) candidate, Chandan Brahma, resulted in the fatal retaliation.
This was linked to the remarks by a BPF leader, Pramila Rani Brahma,
who had commented on April 30 that the Muslim migrants had not voted
for Chandan Brahma. Instead, Muslims had propped up their own
independent candidate, Naba Kumar Sarania alias Hira Sarania, a former
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) rebel from Kokrajhar. This seat
which had always been represented by a Bodo parliamentarian saw the
victory of the first non-Bodo: Sarania.
To dwell further back, it was in 1993 when the first large-scale
massacre had occurred in which 50 migrants were killed in Kokrajhar and
Bongaigaon districts. In 1994, 100 migrants were similarly killed in
the Bodo areas. In 1996, another minority community, the Santhals, was
targeted by the Bodos leading to the death of 200 people and
displacement of thousands. In 2008, very similar to the latest round of
violence, about 100 people were killed and nearly 200,000 displaced in
clashes between the Bodos and the minority communities. In 2012, again
nearly 96 people had lost their lives and 400,000 were displaced in
another such violent incident.
Deciphering Causes
Though the underlying causes of the recurring violence are complex,
they can be deciphered. First, the political empowerment of the minority
communities in the Bodo Territorial Area District (BTAD) in recent
years has resulted in growing unease in the Bodo community. The fear is
about non-Bodo communities dominating the political process as seen in
the election of Sarania. Second, political tension in the area is
further compounded by the perception among the Bodos that illegal
migration from Bangladesh is relegating them to a minority status in
their own land. The Bodos at present constitute 29 per cent of the
population, followed by the Rajbonshis (15 per cent), Bengali
immigrants (12 to 13 per cent) and Santhals (6 per cent). Third, the
‘perception’ of massive illegal migration has generated a fear psychosis
in the Bodo community that their ancestral lands will be illegally
taken away by the migrants. The lack of any reliable data on the number
of people migrating from Bangladesh into Assam further aggravates the
situation. Fourth, the inclusion of illegal migrants in the voters list
is viewed as a deliberate ploy to empower an outside group
vis-à-vis the Bodos, so that the latter lose their distinct indigenous identity. This has created a siege mentality among Bodos.
The situation has been further compounded by the failure of the Bodo
Territorial Council (BTC) to mitigate the fears of the Bodos. For
instance, the Bodo Accord of 2003 clearly stated that the BTC will
“fulfill the economic, educational, and linguistic aspirations and the
preservation of land-rights socio-cultural and ethnic identity of the
Bodos.” Despite these provisions the Bodos continue to feel insecure
vis-à-vis
the minority communities due to weak administrative institutions that
have failed to lock in their rights. The divisive politics of the
members of the BTC have also added to the insecurity. For example, in
May 2012, the BTC Chief Hagrama Mohilary had accused the minority
representative in the BTC, Kalilur Rehman of the Congress, of
instigating the minority community against the Bodos, which had led to
the death of nearly 96 people (both Bodo and non-Bodo), without
offering concrete evidence to back up his claims.
Violence Affected BTAD Areas of Assam
The BTC has failed to assuage the fears of the non-Bodos too. In
terms of composition, the BTC has 46 seats of which 30 are reserved for
Scheduled Tribes (read Bodos), five for non-tribals, five are open to
all communities and the remaining six are to be nominated by the
governor of Assam from among the communities. In a Council, where
policy decisions in terms of development packages, land revenue,
business tax and so on are based on a majority vote, it is clear that
the Bodos are the privileged lot. The BTC is also vested with powers
under the Panchayati Raj system. While the Bodo Accord explicitly
states that the non-tribal population will not be disadvantaged by the
provisions of the Accord, in reality, their rights are not duly
acknowledged by the BTC, creating enormous apprehensions. The final
cause of the recurring violence is the existence of armed groups like
the NDFB-S, the Birsa Commando Force (BCF) representing the Santhals,
etc., which have the capability to challenge the authority of the state
administration.
Of serious concern is the inability of the local law enforcement
agencies to stop retaliatory violence in time. Be it the July 2012 or
May 2014 incident or even the latest round of violence, there were
intelligence inputs suggesting a possible strike by the NDFB-S in some
of the villages. But the state machinery failed to take effective
security measures in villages near the Assam-Bhutan border where the
NDFB (S) has a presence. It is important to demonstrate security
presence in areas where an armed outfit is expected to strike.
Groups like the NDFB (S) are propelled by a strategy of instilling
fear through intimidation of the local people (especially non-Bodos)
in areas where they operate. Their presence is vindicated by the local
discourses that propagate how non-Bodos are coming in droves and
settling down in Bodo areas, thereby illegally taking away the ancestral
lands and properties of the original inhabitants. The absence of
well-documented land records further perpetuates the sense of fear,
which is not all together misplaced. In an atmosphere that is already
highly polarised along ethnic lines, the local politicians too try to
politicise and exploit the prevalent insecurities to serve their vested
interests.
Policy Intervention
The way out of this violence is to concentrate on three important
policy interventions. First, establish a land record system that is
computerised and accessible to the local people, and which can address
the fear of loss of land to the outsiders. Second, improve the presence
of both the state civil administration and the law enforcement agencies
in areas that are identified as highly susceptible to ethnic violence.
Last, but not the least, the state and union governments need to work
together to collate credible data on the flow of migrants into areas
that have been included in the BTAD. This is also relevant for other
areas like the hills of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya and
Nagaland, where despite provisions for safeguarding the ancestral
lands, local people have the same anxieties and concerns, which could
spiral into violence in the near future on a similar pattern.
