T
here is quite an air of anticipation
around the Indian Prime
Minister’s visit to France. The
government’s foreign policy
pace has been enviable, and Narendra Modi
has demonstrated a remarkable aptitude
in gauging the mood and the space to
manoeuvre with various partners. He has
revitalised old relationships and lent them
his energy. He has also achieved some real
strategic gains, such as the one in Seychelles.
The visit to France is pregnant
with possibilities that are rooted in a historic
context and which now need to be
leveraged on a broader plane.
France has always been a critical partner
to India in high technology areas. Its
bid to aid India in the diversification of its
defence sector began as early as 1953,
when the Dassault-Ouragan fighters were
supplied to the India Air Force and played
a leading role in the 1961 liberation of Goa.
Significantly, when India-U.K. defence relations
soured in the 1970s, France
emerged as the only western power willing
to supply India with state-of-the-art
weaponry and support its space programme
and nuclear development. The
importance of France as a key partner was
accentuated in 1998 when, following India’s
nuclear tests, France actively thwarted
United Nations Security Council
sanctions and forced a toning down of the
final language even as the Russians dithered.
During that period, India’s agreement
to launch satellites from French
Guinea stayed intact despite the sanctions
imposed by other European Union countries
across a range of technological sectors,
especially space. In 1999, during the
Kargil war, the French maintained a supply
of spares to the IAF, which allowed it to
operate without worrying about expending
smart weapon reserves.
France was arguably the first western
country to de-hyphenate its relations with
Pakistan from those with India, deciding
that the artificial “balance of power” equation
between the two was passé. Today,
France is at the forefront of India’s ambitions
of modernising its sub-surface fleet.
Scorpène class submarines are being built
at Mazagaon docks and Dassault’s Rafale
has won the Medium Multi-Role Combat
Aircraft (MMRCA) tender. India’s only
dedicated military satellite, the GSAT-7,
was launched from Ariane 5, from Kourou.
Despite all this, it seems as if the tenor of
the Indo-French engagement is being determined
only by the progress on the Rafale
deal. Much like the U.S. and India
relationship, which had to find a way past
the Civil Nuclear Agreement that hung
heavy like the proverbial albatross, the India-France
partnership must move beyond
the circular meanderings that the
negotiations look like to outsiders. One
way or another, we must strive for an early
conclusion, as this is not just about one set
of aircraft but about investment in a host
of current and future possibilities presented
by India’s growing economic and geostrategic
strength. The Rafale deal must be
placed in a broader framework of association.
This framework could include three
key elements, among others.
Nuclear cooperation
The first is for France to translate into
action its previously expressed acceptance
of India’s stance of nuclear exceptionalism
and for the two countries to enter into
full-spectrum collaboration. Such a partnership
should be aimed at reducing the
incubation time of Indian nuclear technologies
and would cover the full nuclear
cycle, including reactors, enrichment and
reprocessing. This nuclear cooperation
would logically extend into the sphere of
military nuclear propulsion. The upcoming
French Barracuda class SSN, for example,
is optimally suited to the Indian
Navy’s needs. If India buying the Rafale is
the truest sign of India’s commitment to
the relationship, then the nuclear submarine
may well be the litmus test of French
reciprocity.
But, again, it is important not to get
fixated only on the big-ticket items but to
use the other opportunities that signature
government initiatives like “Skilling” and
“Make in India” offer alongside these big
deals. The French could, for example, help
develop the defence sector eco-system in
India, especially in the small and medium
segments, investing in skills and capacity
building here. This is where the real value
addition takes place in the defence business
and this could be the differentiator
between France and other countries.
The second element must be regional
cooperation. Increasingly, the interests of
the two countries have intersected and
their views tend to be similar even if their
positions are not. Much of this is because
Indian and French foreign policies share
the same fundamental view of strategic
autonomy and refuse to cede security primacy
to one or two actors. It was because
of this that India had, in 2013, co-sponsored
a UN resolution that paved the way
for French intervention in Mali. This is
why it needs to cooperate in the Indian
Ocean, West Asia and North Africa. India
and France have significant interests here
and it is perhaps time to build a robust
platform for dialogue that will allow the
two nations to cooperate meaningfully.
West Asia and North Africa are in the
midst of a turbulent period of dramatic
change. India’s chief task is to secure its
energy source, the safety of its diaspora,
and the stability of its extended neighbourhood.
France will continue to play a
significant role in the region.
As for the Indian Ocean area, France is a
major power here and has demonstrated
some degree of interest in cooperating
with India. A focussed engagement would
also be a natural extension of the collaboration
envisaged here between the U.S.
and India earlier this year. Co-investing
with France in a ‘research’ facility located
in Mauritius may serve as the point of
convergence for such a regional play. This
could form the basis for intensified cooperation
on maritime domain awareness,
building capacity in Indian Ocean Rim
countries, and in honing synergistic strategies
to deal with humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief.
Accord on climate
Finally, France is set to host the most
important of climate conventions at the
end of this year, one that will determine
the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. This
makes for an important area where the
two countries can cooperate. The climate
agreement can impact energy access and
energy options for most countries, including
India. The French are familiar with the
Indian effort to eliminate poverty and the
principal role that low-cost energy could
play in meeting this goal.
The Paris climate meet will be an optimal
moment for India to stop being defensive
about the issue. It must unhesitatingly
showcase all that it has already undertaken
and achieved in responding to the challenge
of climate change. It must clearly
signal what it seeks from the outcome to
protect its development space. And
France, with its agenda-setting capacity
and consensus-building role, must strive
to ensure a climate deal that is fair and
equitable and allows India critical room to
manoeuvre.
