As Britain, the U.S. and Russia debate the revamping of their nuclear deterrence systems, India needs open and democratic discussion on its arsenal and capability
Jeremy Corbyn, eternal rebel and newly elected leader of Britain’s Labour Party, declared recently on a radio news programme that there were
no circumstances in which he could fire a nuclear weapon. Mr. Corbyn’s personal views are not new: he has campaigned all his political life
against nuclear weapons. However, as Leader of the Opposition, and theoretically the man who would find himself in control of the ‘nuclear button’ if he became Prime Minister, his renunciation of the nuclear option has prompted considerable national engagement with the future and purpose of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. This discussion has found focus in the
renewal of ‘Trident’, the basis for the U.K.’s current nuclear deterrence posture, but inevitably encompasses a wider discussion about Britain’s global role. However, while this is a domestic debate about Britain’s future, the larger discussion could resonate beyond Britain. And India could do worse than take note.
Priyanjali Malik
What is at stake is the continuous at-sea deterrence provided by the Trident system of four nuclear submarines and their accompanying missiles and warheads. Since 1969, at any given time, one submarine has been out at sea, one boat undergoing maintenance and the other two in port or on training manoeuvres. Now a decision on the future of this generation of submarines is due, as they will reach the end of their working life in the late 2020s. If Britain wishes to continue its reliance on nuclear deterrence, then new warheads will also need to be considered in the coming decade. The bill for all of this is in the region of £20 billion for the boats and another six billion for the warheads (Ministry of Defence figures).
The Trident’s future — to keep like-for-like, modify, or scrap altogether — has been discussed for the better part of this century. An independent cross-party inquiry into nuclear defence policy concluded in a July 2014 report that, on balance, despite there being no obvious current and emerging threats that might lend themselves to a nuclear solution, Britain needed to keep its deterrent.
The report did not move mountains. Then again, neither could the rival camp gain much traction. Opposition to Trident ranges from calls for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons globally and for Britain to fulfil its Article VI disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (and Mr. Corbyn is a prominent proponent of this view) to those calling for a debate on whether Britain needs such an expensive, continuous deterrent with as many subs and missiles at a time of aggressive spending cuts to the conventional defence bill. These positions bookend a range of other views.
Buried in this security debate is some fairly fundamental soul-searching about Britain’s place in the world. What lies unsaid is the fear that this nuclear armoury may be all that is standing between Britain and relegation to a has-been global power. Those in favour of continuity also point to Britain’s NATO obligations and the effect that nuclear renunciation may have on the U.K.’s relationship with the U.S.
Indian experienceIn these last two respects, India is at the other end of the spectrum. The exact importance of
nuclear weapons in India’s rise is debatable, but few dispute that the country’s nukes play some role in its global ambitions. As for what sort of deterrence India needs, there is, of course, a discussion to be had on whether the threats India currently faces — terrorism, insurgency or difficult neighbours, to name a few, are best served by the current (not entirely clear) deterrent setup. And how, if at all, this might change in the future.
After all,
India’s nuclear policy is not a subject of popular debate, nor indeed one on which the Leader of the Opposition might wish to stake a position. The British at least know what they are critiquing in examining whether a Cold War nuclear apparatus is still relevant. Half a century on, we Indians may not be in a similar position to knowledgeably engage with a middle-aged arsenal. India has now been a declared possessor of nuclear weapons for over 15 years. Yet, beyond assurances that our deterrence rests on the possession of a triad of nuclear assets and a doctrine of ‘no first use’, we know very little. Numbers of warheads, numbers of missiles, costs involved — all these factors are jealously guarded. This may be acceptable in a young, growing armoury (though that is debatable), but in the long run, such oblivion is unhelpful. At some point, however, some spring-cleaning is in order. Britain is not the only one looking at a hefty bill for the next generation of deterrent — the U.S. is embarking on a $348 billion, decade-long modernisation drive and one-third of Russia’s military budget is earmarked for nuclear modernisation.
Not for all timeGiven the nuclear company we keep in our neighbourhood, and given the current international environment where the nuclear contours of relations between
Russia and NATO appear to be acquiring a sharper edge, it is imperative that we get familiar with the limits of deterrence. Especially as most of India’s current threats will not admit to a nuclear solution. Until 1998, it was enough that deterrence rested ultimately on the vague threat of possible nuclear retaliation. After Pokharan II, the ‘possible’ and the ‘vague’ have gone; we are left now with assured ‘massive’ retaliatory destruction. If that is the case, then have we the right kit at our disposal? Too much, too little, just right? Will this continue to be the case decades down the line when this generation of delivery systems and warheads reach the end of their life?
Seventy years of non-use should not blind us to the nature of this ultimate guarantor. In Britain, this unpalatable fact is highlighted by knowledge of the final delegation of nuclear command. Democratic discussion on India’s nuclear deterrent will not threaten the country’s regional or global position, let alone its survival. It might even build consensus on what sort of country and strategic future we want. Let’s talk.
