The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a group of countries that seeks to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through the control of nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.
The NSG is also referred to as the "London Club".
NSG has 48 members. Prominent ones are Germany, Australia, United Kingdom, USA, Brazil,Canada, China, Russia, Japan,Republic of Korea etc.
The member countries adhere to following criteria.
1.They have ability to supply nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.
2.Adhere to and act in accordance with NSG guidelines
3. A legally based domestic export control system which acts in accordance with the NSG Guidelines
4. Full compliance with NPT or the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Bangkok, or an equivalent international nuclear nonproliferation agreement
5. Support to efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles.
NSG Guidelines
The NSG has established certain guidelines to achieve its objective of non-proliferation.
These NSG Guidelines:
1. aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, while not hindering international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field.
2. facilitate the development of peaceful nuclear trade by providing the means in a manner consistent with international nuclear nonproliferation norms.
In Early 1990's, NSG realized that existing export control provisions could not prevent Iraq from pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
Hence, the NSG in 1992 expanded its guidelines to prevent transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material, and technology (items that have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications). These are called DUAL-USE CONTROLS.
The NSG in 1992 also banned nuclear cooperation with any state that had not accepted IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) comprehensive safeguards.
The NSG guidelines are applied both to members and non-members of the NSG.
The NSG regime is a voluntary association, not bound by a treaty, and therefore has no formal mechanism to enforce compliance.
All decisions at NSG are taken by consensus and not by majority.
NSG and India
India is not a member of NSG.
In 2008, the NSG exempted India from the requirement adopted by the NSG in 1992 banning nuclear cooperation with any state that had not accepted IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) comprehensive safeguards. With this waiver India could conclude nuclear deals with France, Russia, USA etc
India has been seeking NSG membership since 2008. India has fast-paced its pitch for NSG membership in last few months.
India is not a signatory to NPT regime. This has been a major obstacle to India’s entry into the NSG.
WHY does India want to be a member of NSG?
A. STRATEGIC
1. NSG membership may help India to be a part of mainstream of decision making on the issues of export controls and non proliferation.
The NSG revises its guidelines periodically to keep pace with developments in technology. It is desirable that India is associated with this decision making process to protect national interests.
2. India can use its NSG membership to bring international censure on proliferation activities in the neighborhood and might be able to restrain Pakistan and China’s clandestine nuclear activities.
3. India can campaign for arms control and disarmament, particularly with respect to Pakistan and China.
NSG would provide India with a platform to counter the threat of non-state actors arming with nuclear weapons.
TECHNOLOGY
The third stage of India's nuclear program plans to utilize thorium resources. This requires highly advanced enrichment and reprocessing technologies. NSG membership would allow India to collaborate with major players on technology.
NSG membership would help India procure more fuel, nuclear components more effectively. It will also help Indian industry to aggressively tap the global market.
WHAT are possible negative implications?
India may be compelled to adhere to stringent IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol. These additional controls may harm its nuclear commerce.
It may not be possible for India to defy NSG and conduct nuclear tests. The voluntary moratorium declared by India on nuclear testing would effectively be converted to a legally binding norm.
However, much depends on how negotiations on membership proceed and on what terms and conditions NSG admits India.
