The last thrust for the revision of India’s nuclear doctrine was in the run-up to the national elections of 2014, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) manifesto stated that the party intended to “[s]tudy in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times” (BJP 2014: 39). The latest impulse towards reviewing the nuclear doctrine was in April at a seminar of the Indian Pugwash Society (2016), incongruously organised at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi (Indian Pugwash Society 2016).
In discussions on India’s nuclear doctrine, there is a consensus on the need for periodic review. While on this count most agree that a review of the current doctrine adopted in January 2003 by the Cabinet Committee on Security (Prime Minister’s Office 2003) is long overdue, disagreement is over two issues. First, whether the no first use (NFU) posture should be retained, and second, if NFU stays, what is the best manner of retaliation, not only to deter, but also to follow through in case deterrence fails to work. While agreeing on the need for review and for continuing with “retaliation only” doctrine of the National Security Advisory Board (Ministry of External Affairs 1999), this article questions the nuclear retaliation options under discussion.
Higher-order Retaliation
Nuclear retaliation options can be classified according to the levels of retaliation envisaged: higher-order and lower-order retaliatory options. Higher-order options, in turn, are pitched at two levels: “massive” and “unacceptable damage.” The term “massive” figures in the 2003 doctrine (Prime Minister’s Office 2003). Its progeny, the 1999 draft nuclear doctrine favoured “punitive retaliation,” presumably with lesser warhead weight and numbers, to inflict “damage unacceptable” to the enemy (Ministry of External Affairs 1999).
Higher-order nuclear retaliation votaries rely on arguments from the early nuclear era in South Asia. Then, India had only a few bombs in the basement and rudimentary delivery capability. Deterrence was understandably based on dropping these on cities. India was constrained to go in for countervalue targeting, colloquially called “unacceptable damage.” This phrase has since become a mantra, though much water has flown down both the Ganga and the Indus.
Today, India has moved from a defensive conventional military doctrine based on counteroffensives by strike corps, to an offensive doctrine envisaging proactive offensive operations by both, border-guarding pivot corps and offensive strike corps. India’s conventional war doctrine—not explicitly one for limited war (Ahmed 2014: 71)—has the potential to nudge Pakistan’s nuclear redlines. In effect, India is to kick off the conventional war in double quick time, even as Pakistan promises to reach early for the nuclear button.
Under the current nuclear doctrine, this would trigger “massive” retaliation. Its expansive interpretation involves both countervalue and counterforce targeting, while a more moderate interpretation restricts itself to only countervalue targeting (Nagal 2015). Pakistan’s nuclear warheads, now numbering in the lower three digits, confer on it a second-strike capability or ability to strike back even in the case of a higher-order attack on it. With both states having second-strike capability in terms of number of warheads that would survive a higher-order strike, India and Pakistan are now at a stage of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD) (Kidwai and Lavoy 2015: 4). Taken together, the tonnage involved in the retaliatory exchanges would result in an environmental disaster on a global scale. Clearly, “massive” is unthinkable, and a review to excise it from the nuclear doctrine is indeed overdue.
The favoured option to replace the guiding formulation—massive—is “unacceptable damage” or retaliation with “sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable” (Ministry of External Affairs 1999). While the phrase already figures in the doctrine (Prime Minister’s Office 2003), its votaries wish it to have pride of place through a review. To votaries of “unacceptable damage,” when less is enough, going “massive” can only make rubble bounce.
However, Pakistan has put the cat among the pigeons by acquiring tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) as part of its “full spectrum deterrence” (Dalton and Krepon 2015: 3). India’s conventional offensive could trigger Pakistani nuclear first use in the form of TNW (Kidwai and Lavoy 2015: 8–9). Indian retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage not only would be disproportionate, but would open India to receiving unacceptable damage in return. This would have an impact on the credibility of “unacceptable damage” to deter. Believing its nuclear numbers have checkmated higher-order retaliation, Pakistan may up the ante in the face of Indian conventional attack at a lower-order level with TNW. Therefore, “unacceptable damage” is no advance.
There are two other disadvantages. First, both higher-order options—massive and unacceptable damage—pressure a first-strike attempt on Pakistan’s part. First strike is an attempt to disarm an enemy’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Pakistan apprehending higher-order retaliation from India could well go first, not with TNW, but with higher-order nuclear first use, intended to set back India’s retaliatory capability. Second, NFU is further threatened with abandonment. Higher-order options are predicated on a belief that India can survive nuclear war, while Pakistan cannot. This induces a belief that it might be prudent to get a grievous nuclear blow in first. Doing so would set back a Pakistani counter-strike, which would be further degraded by India’s missile shield, enabling India to survive. Such thinking contributes to the arguments against NFU and to technological thrusts that make this possible: ballistic missile defences, surveillance, accuracy, and multiple warheads.
The assumption that India can survive needs debunking. Along with the environmental and economic consequences, the likely sociopolitical effects also have to be factored in. To illustrate with a scenario, a nuclear war could see its largest minority, its Muslims, further beleaguered. The magnitude of the Gujarat pogrom of February 2002 was aggravated by the context of the then ongoing crisis in the wake of the 13 December 2001 terror attack on Parliament. A decade and half down the road, India’s minority is in more dire straits. Under the circumstances, should Pakistan use nuclear weapons, the minority would end up a readily available scapegoat. In effect, the fallout of nuclear war would be in the reinforcing of the right wing in policy, of authoritarianism in governance and of militarisation of society. Manifestly, even if Pakistan is “finished,” India as we know it would be too. Hence, higher-order options are just as suicidal as they are genocidal.
Lower-order Retaliation
This brings to fore the lower-order retaliation options. Higher-order nuclear first use is ruled out by the onset of MAD. For Pakistan, its graduated deterrence posture serves to extend the nuclear deterrence cover to the conventional level by signalling crossing of thresholds by India’s conventional operations. The most likely nuclear first use scenario is of Pakistani TNW against India’s conventional forces. This can be at two levels: one, targeting Indian offensive forces, and the second, as nuclear messaging. The first requires many warheads and would cause considerable collateral damage. The second may be for catalysing international intervention by signalling onset of nuclear war. The latter is the more likely manner of nuclear first use by Pakistan.
Lower-order nuclear first use in this manner can best be answered by lower-order retaliation. This option abjures higher-order retaliation and is escalation-control friendly since it incentivises restraint by Pakistan. In-conflict deterrence does not suffer since higher exchanges remain a threat-in-being. Critics, however, could argue that it risks inducing a belief that Pakistan could get away lightly for the temerity of violating the seven-decade long nuclear taboo. However, the converse is equally true: since it provides a credible answer to Pakistan’s TNW, it strengthens deterrence.
The second criticism is of the potential arms race impacting the “minimum” in India’s doctrine of “credible minimum nuclear deterrence” (Ministry of External Affairs 1999) and knock-on nightmares for operationalisation and civil–military relations. As has been seen, Pakistan’s use of TNW would most likely be for nuclear messaging, rather than in a massed mode to stop India’s conventional forces. Since three out of five of India’s nuclear tests 18 years ago at Pokhran II were of the sub-kiloton variety, India likely has the nuclear ordinance. Therefore, a lower-order response does not imply acquiring TNW in large numbers, but employing existing capability in selective, non-escalatory targeting. This could induce a possible reversion to strategic sanity, and at the least possible cost in terms of nuclear damage sustained and inflicted.
However, lower-order options assume escalation control. The charged atmosphere of a war gone nuclear can be expected to put paid to political rationality and strategic thinking. Escalation control, therefore, requires prior arrangements with doctrinal exchanges between the two sides as a first step. Escalation control mechanisms can even be tacit and reliant on foreign powers trusted by both sides. However, in a circumstance as currently obtains, with the two not even talking to each other, creating such mechanisms can be ruled out. The paradox is that where trust levels enable such mechanisms, these mechanisms would not be required in first place.
Caveat to Proportionate Retaliation
In case India has to persist with its nuclear doctrine of higher-order retaliation, it has to wind down the offensive content of its conventional doctrine. With no reflexive Indian conventional offensives, there would be no crossing of redlines. There would be no need for punitive retaliation that can only draw like punishment on India in turn. However, India wishes to keep its conventional advantage honed, to tamp down on Pakistan’s propensity for proxy war. India cannot have its cake and eat it too. It requires the tempering of its nuclear doctrine. Proportionate retaliation fits the bill. It deters higher-order nuclear first use, and to lower-order first use, enables lower retaliation.
However, proportionate retaliation needs a caveat. As has been seen, lower-order nuclear first use by Pakistan would be less to halt India’s armoured thrusts, and more for nuclear messaging to warn off India and bring international conflict termination pressures. Proportionate retaliation in a lower-order mode to this most likely scenario may not be the best response. It would imply shooting back, with attendant escalation risks. The more appropriate response to this most likely manner of Pakistani nuclear first use is nuclear non-retaliation. This is the caveat to proportionate retaliation.
Nuclear non-retaliation appears to be an oxymoron, when deterrence is taken as obtaining from credibility, predicated on capability and intent. However, nuclear non-retaliation is compatible with the concept of existential deterrence, which posits that the very possession of nuclear weapons deters. There is no compelling need for displaying a resolve and will, and building a variegated nuclear arsenal. It is in line with the two pillars of the nuclear doctrine that commands a consensus, NFU and minimum deterrence. Absence of nuclear retaliation from India in such a case would be de-escalatory, reducing the premium on escalation control.
By abjuring nuclear weapons, India can capture the political and moral high ground. It would put Pakistan’s leadership in the dock. It can continue applying its conventional military advantage, since international pressures would be on Pakistan. The military exercises this year—Shatrujeet and Chakravayuh-II—testify that India’s military is well practised, even though the separate press releases on the exercises carefully omit mention of any nuclear backdrop (Ministry of Defence 2016a, 2016b).
The effect of the caveat—nuclear non-retaliation—is that the bets are off in case Pakistan persists or escalates. Deterrence is not absent since any nuclear action enhances the probability of escalation. Pakistan cannot persist with strikes since the caveat only covers nuclear first use and not subsequent strikes, deterred by proportionate retaliation.
The Best Option of All
The aim in a war gone nuclear should be to heed K Sundarji, who had it that nuclear exchanges must be terminated at the lowest threshold of nuclear use (Sundarji 2003: 146–53). He further went on to say that this must be done for the conflict itself, if necessary by unilateral politically feasible concessions. Instead of his sage arguments voiced in the discussion, the debate is confined to realists arguing over which of the two higher-order options is better: massive or unacceptable damage. In a MAD situation, both being insane, proportionate retaliation enabling lower-order retaliation is a contribution from the liberal perspective. This enables Sundarji’s stricture that a nuclear war be brought to its end straight at its very outset. The caveat of initial non-retaliation is one such measure.
Voices other than those of realists need to be heard in the debates on nuclear doctrine. The realists underemphasise the equalising effect of nuclear weapons. Strategists of the liberal perspective are wishful in believing that escalation control is possible. The anti-nuclear community is missing in action in the debate. Here, non-retaliation is taken as a caveat. An abolitionist’s contribution to the debate could well be that non-retaliation is the best option across the board; indeed, to even higher-order nuclear first use. This is strategically sustainable, even if it is deterrence heresy. It can yet carry the day since nuclear “employment strategy”—to be used when the balloon goes up—is distinct from nuclear “deterrence doctrine,” to keep the balloon tethered in peacetime. Nuclear abolitionists avoiding the nuclear deterrence debate is well founded in
the fear that the deterrence discussion legitimises nuclear weapons and that deterrence is a false god. However, such avoidance is not without a price. Thinking about the least damaging way nuclear weapons can be employed may prevent worse outcomes, inevitable when their use is hijacked by nuclear hawks.
